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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (2005) as the matter that has been transferred to the Court of 
Appeals by the Utah Supreme Court. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the Trial Court correctly determined as a Finding of Fact that Ada 
R. Craig intended that the 1981 Deed she executed created both a joint tenancy interest 
and retained for herself a possessory life estate. The standard of review regarding 
findings of fact, is that the Utah Court of Appeals will not set aside the Trial Court's 
findings unless clearly erroneous. Chen v. Stewart, 100 P.3d 1177, 1184 (Utah 2004). 
2. Whether the Trial Court correctly determined that Ada R. Craig maintained 
a possessory life estate until her death on July 11, 2003 and intended to retain day-to-day 
control over the property, thereby defeating Appellants' right to an accounting for profits 
of the property until her death. The standard of review regarding findings of fact, is that 
the Utah Court of Appeals will not set aside the Trial Court's findings unless clearly 
erroneous. Chen v. Stewart, 100 P.3d 1177, 1184 (Utah 2004). 
3. Whether the Trial Court, at its discretion, properly appointed Robert D. 
Irvine as receiver of the property. The standard of review is that the appointment of a 
receiver or the refusal to appoint is in the sound discretion of the Trial Court and the Utah 
Court of Appeals will not overturn on appeal unless the Trial Court abused its discretion. 
Skirvin v. Mesta, 141 F.2d 668, 673 (10th Cir. Ct. App. 1944). Further, this determination 
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is now moot and the Court in its discretion should summarily dismiss this issue on 
appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This was a case for partition of that real property which was the personal residence 
of Ada R. Craig for most of her life (the "Home"), which was tried before the Utah 
District Court for Salt Lake County, Utah, Judge Hansen presiding, on September 28-29, 
2004. The court issued its oral ruling on October 14, 2004, after having taken the matter 
under advisement. The Trial Court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
and Order in favor of the Appellee [Plaintiff] on December 6, 2004, and appointed 
Appellee as Receiver to sell the Home. 
Appellants filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the court on November 10, 
2004, which was denied. Appellants filed with the Trial Court another post-trial Rule 
59(e) Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment on December 20, 2004, which was also 
denied. 
Appellants appealed from this final post-trial motion to the Utah Supreme Court. 
The appeal was transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals for disposition pursuant to 
Section 78-2-2(4), Utah Code Annotated on February 15, 2005. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Ada R. Craig was the sole owner of her residence, real property located at 
251 East 1700 South, Salt Lake City, Utah (the "Home"), until January 18, 1981. (Trial 
Exhibit No.7, ^[1; Transcript Volume II, pp. 5-7). 
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2. Ada R. Craig owned the Home and used it as her personal residence from 
approximately January 1973 until her death on July 11, 2003. During that entire time, 
she maintained the Home at her sole expense. (Trial Exhibit No.7, ^2; Transcript 
Volume II, pp. 27-30). 
3. Appellant Colleen Erickson lived in the Home under her mother's care and 
support for 46 years, including a period of several years after she married and had a child. 
(Trial Exhibit No.7, TJ2). Appellant Sharon Anderson lived with her mother in the Home 
for 43 years from 1954 to 1997. (Transcript p.3). 
4. On January 19, 1981, Ada R. Craig executed a Quit-Claim Deed regarding 
the Home with the following language, "ADA R. CRAIG ... hereby QUIT-CLAIMS to 
ADA R. CRAIG, SHARON V. CRAIG and COLLEEN R. CRAIG as Joint Tenants with 
full rights of survivorship and not as tenants in common, reserving a life estate only for 
ADA R. CRAIG." (Trial Exhibit No.l) (herein the "1981 Deed"). 
5. Ada R. Craig stated in a letter to her daughters [Appellants] that she 
executed the 1981 Deed because "At the time I signed a quit claim deeding one third of 
my Home to each of you, I was concerned about Mark's [one of Ada's sons] wife causing 
some kind of a problem that could place my house in jeopardy. Also at that time you 
were single and my other children were married and living on their own." (Trial Exhibit 
No.7,1Jl). 
6. Sharon Anderson testified that she understood that her mother, Ada R. 
Craig, intended for her to inherit the Home after her mother's death and that she would 
not receive that inheritance until her mother passed away. (Transcript, p. 5). 
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7. Colleen Erickson testified concerning the 1981 Deed that, "Shar[on] had a 
third and I had a third and my mom had a third, contingent upon the life estate of the 
property." (Transcript p. 69, line 9-10). 
8. In the latter part of 1998 it became necessary for Ada R. Craig to move 
from her Home for the purpose of receiving extended assistance and care in a local 
nursing care facility. (Transcript Volume II, pp. 13-14). 
9. In 1999, Ada R. Craig gave her eldest son, Robert D. Irvine, powers of 
attorney by signing a Durable Power of Attorney for the purpose of helping her manage 
the Home and assist her with her move into the Highland Care Center at the approximate 
cost of $5200 or $5300 per month. (Trial Exhibit No.8; Transcript Volume II, pp 20-22). 
10. At the time Ada R. Craig moved into the Highland Care Center, the only 
substantial asset available to her to help pay for her care and other expenses was her 
Home. (Transcript Volume II, p. 27). 
11. At the time Ada R. Craig moved into Highland Care Center, Appellants 
Sharon Anderson and Colleen Erickson refused to consent to the sale of their mother's 
house or her one-third joint tenancy interest, to pay for her care and other needs. 
(Transcript Volume II, pp. 31-35). 
12. At the time Ada R. Craig moved into the Highland Care Center, Appellee 
and his wife provided their own personal financial assistance for the payment of the 
Highland Care Center monthly costs and other needs of Ada R. Craig and paid 
approximately $175,000 over the course of 3-4 years for Ada's care. (Transcript Volume 
II, p. 26). 
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13. On or about January 21, 1999, Ada R. Craig, with the assistance of her 
attorney, quit-claimed her remaining one-third joint tenancy interest to another daughter, 
Carolyn Abbott. Once again she retained her life estate, (January 21, 1999 Deed). (Trial 
Exhibit No.2, Transcript Volume II, pp. 35-37, 51, 53) 
14. The January 21, 1999 deed stated "ADA R. CRAIG also known as RAE S. 
CRAIG ... grantor hereby QUIT-CLAIM to CAROLYN ABBOTT grantee the following 
described tract of land, reserving to the Grantor a life estate." (Trial Exhibit No.2; 
Transcript Volume II pp 35-37, 51, 53). 
15. On February 2, 1999, Ada R. Craig sent a letter to her daughters (the 
Appellants) stating the following: "I didn't think I would ever be writing a letter to one of 
my children pleading for what already belongs to me. I now find it necessary to write to 
two of my children who have taken the position that the Home that I have owned for over 
fifty years no longer belongs to me ... It was never my intention that each of you receive 
one third of my Home until my death and you know that as well as I do ... When the 
funds from the sale of my Home are no longer needed in my behalf, it is my desire that 
you will receive your share of those funds as was intended when I quit claimed the Home 
to the three of us." (Trial Exhibit No.7; Transcript Volume II pp. 40-43). 
16. On or about May 20, 2002, Carolyn Abbott conveyed her interest in the 
Home to Appellee, Robert D Irvine, for the purpose of furthering efforts to sell Ada's 
Home or at least her one-third interest therein and because Appellee had paid nearly all of 
Ada's nursing Home expenses. (Trial Exhibit No.3; Transcript Volume II, pp. 37-38). 
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17. Using his Power-of-Attorney, from approximately January 21, 1999 until 
his mother's death, Robert D. Irvine, at the direction of his mother, was able to rent the 
Home and use the modest net rental income to help provide for his mother's care. 
(Transcript Volume II, pp. 18-22, 26-27, 34). 
18. Ada R. Craig passed away on July 11, 2003. 
19. Immediately following the death of Ada R. Craig, Appellants claimed sole 
right and possession to the Home and excluded Appellee from the Home. Finally, 
Appellee brought this action to realize his rightful one-third interest in the Property, 
(Complaint, pp.4-6). 
20. Robert D. Irvine had substantial experience in buying and selling real 
property and in managing real property and was a logical choice for appointment as a 
receiver. 
21. Mr. Irvine was able to quickly accomplish a sale of the Home and at the 
hearing for approval of the sale, Appellants instead purchased the one-third interest of 
Mr. Irvine. (See Motion for Court Approval of Real Property p. 2). 
22. The Trial Court, based on testimony of the parties and exhibits at trial, 
made Findings of Fact as follows: 
1. There were two main issues presented at trial by the parties to the Court. 
First, what interest, if any, did Ada R. Craig ("Craig") have in the real 
property after executing the January 19, 1981 deed; and second, if Craig 
owned a joint tenancy interest in the real property following the execution 
of the January 19, 1981 deed, was she competent to transfer her interest in 
the property to her other daughter, Carolyn Abbott. 
2. Based upon the strict application of the words of the deed, the Court 
finds that Ada R. Craig conveyed to herself and to her daughters Sharon 
Craig Anderson and Colleen Craig Erickson the property in joint tenancy, 
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with full rights of survivorship, and in addition to her one-third joint-
tenancy interest, Craig also granted to herself a life estate in the real 
property. 
3. The Court also finds that Ada Craig intended to grant un[to] herself and 
to her daughters a joint tenancy interest in the property, and [in] addition to 
her one-third joint tenancy interest, Craig also intended to grant to herself a 
life estate in the real property. 
4. There was not any believable or persuasive evidence that Ada Craig 
intended to abandon control of the day to day operations or control of the 
property while Ada was alive. The evidence suggests that she intended to 
retain control over the property. 
5. Following the execution of the 1981 Deed, Ada Craig, Sharon Anderson 
and Colleen Erickson shared a one-third interest in the totality of the 
property as joint tenants, with rights of survivorship. 
6. Ada Craig retained a joint tenancy interest so that if one or both of her 
daughters predeceased her, a share or all of the property would return to 
Craig, and not go to another family member of the co-owner daughters. She 
was interested in giving the property to her daughters if she died, but was 
not interested in giving the property to one of her daughters' heirs if a 
daughter predeceased her. She therefore intended to retain a joint tenancy 
interest in the property. 
7. The life estate Craig retained in addition to her joint tenancy interest was 
also retained for another important purpose: By creating a life estate only 
for herself, Ada intended to retain day-to-day control of the property. The 
'reserving a life estate only" language in the 1981 deed was intended to 
reserve the life estate only in the name of Ada, and not in the name of her 
daughters, which excludes her two daughters from control of the property 
while Ada Craig was alive. 
8. The evidence shows that Ada Craig said she owned the property 
following the 1981 deed, and also that Colleen Erickson testified that this 
was a l/3rd, l/3rd, l/3rd ownership relationship between Ada, Colleen 
Erickson, and Sharon Anderson. Other witnesses who testified for plaintiff 
supported this interpretation of Ada Craig's ownership intent. 
9. Whether one looks to Ada's intent, or looking at the actual language of 
the 1981 deed, the result is the same, as specified above. (Findings of Fact, 
pp. 2-3). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The Trial Court correctly found that the 1981 Deed created both a 
possessory life estate and a joint tenancy interest in Ada R. Craig. While interpreting a 
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deed, the intent of the grantor prevails. Khalsa v. Ward, 101 P.3d 843, 845 (Ut. Ct. App. 
2004). The primary rule of construction for a deed is that the intent of the grantor should 
be determined and carried out. 23 Am. Jur. 2d Deeds § 193 (2005). The Trial Court 
determined, as a Finding of Fact that Ada R. Craig intended to grant a joint tenancy 
interest to herself, Sharon Anderson and Colleen Erickson, each with 1/3 interests in the 
Home for the purpose of giving the Home to them if she passed away. (See Findings of 
Fact Tflj 2-7). In addition, the Trial Court found that Ada R. Craig intended to retain a life 
estate so that she could maintain the day-to-day control and use of the Home for her 
lifetime. (See Findings of Fact ^[ 2-7). Therefore, unless Appellants demonstrate clear 
error by the Trial Court, this Court should uphold the Trial Court. Courts have 
determined that a life estate and a tenancy in common are not inconsistent estates and can 
be held in the same person at the same point in time. See United States v. Gibbons, 71 
F.3d 1496, 1500 (10th Cir. Ct. App. 1995). Therefore, the Trial Court's findings should 
stand. 
2. The Trial Court correctly determined that the Appellants are not entitled to 
an accounting for rents and expenses of the Home through the period of time that Ada R. 
Craig was still alive and in need of the meager rental income which helped contribute to 
her living needs. The Trial Court determined, as a matter of fact, that Ada R. Craig's 
intent was to maintain the day-to-day control of the Home while alive, thereby excluding 
her two daughters from control of the Home while she was living. (See Findings of Fact |^ 
7). The Trial Court further determined that Ada R. Craig's intent in 1981 was that her 
daughters receive the Home upon her death, but not prior. (See Findings of Fact f^ 6). 
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Based on the facts and the language of the 1981 Deed and the January 21, 1999 deed, the 
Trial Court correctly determined that Ada R. Craig had properly retained a life estate. 
(Conclusions of Law, p. 2). Therefore, unless the Appellants demonstrate clear error and 
the Court determines that the Trial Court incorrectly determined the law, the Court should 
uphold the Trial Court's findings. Moreover, the possessor of a life estate is entitled to 
all of the property's rents and profits. See Hammond v. McArthur, 183 P.2d 1 (CA. 1947) 
(Wherein one joint tenant conveyed to the other a life estate in the property with the right 
to all of its rents and profits - the court held that the granting of the life estate did not 
terminate the joint tenancy insofar as the right of survivorship was concerned). 
3. The Trial Court acted properly within its discretion to appoint Robert D. 
Irvine as receiver of the Home under its close supervision. Mr. Irvine had substantial 
experience with real estate and was credible and trustworthy. Mr. Irvine's instruction 
from the Trial Court was to sell the property under the close scrutiny of the Trial Court. 
Mr. Irvine procured a sale, but Appellants preempted the sale when on the eve of court 
approval of the sale, Appellants instead offered to purchase the 1/3 interest of Mr. Irvine. 
The purchase of the one-third interest of Mr. Irvine by Appellants has rendered the issue 
moot. 
4. Appelle prevailed at trial and on all post-trial motions. Appellee is entitled 
to his costs of appeal in accordance with Rule 34(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure and upon presentation of a bill of costs. 
ARGUMENTS 
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I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT 
THE 1981 DEED CREATED A POSSESSORY LIFE 
ESTATE AND A JOINT TENANCY INTEREST IN THE 
GRANTOR CONSISTENT WITH THE GRANTOR'S 
INTENT. 
A. The Standard of Review for Findings of Fact is Clear Error. 
Although the Trial Court made Findings of Fact, Appellants have made no 
reference to set those aside, have marshaled no evidence in opposition, and have relied 
solely on their technical legal argument. Not surprisingly, the Trial Court found against 
Appellants on every factual issue presented. 
Appellants have stated to this Court that the standard of review is merely the 
standard of "correctness". Appellants have flatly ignored the Findings of Fact which 
supported the Trial Court's Conclusions of Law. The issues raised by Appellants are 
mixed issues of fact and law. For such issues, the Court must divide its deliberations 
between legal issues and fact issues. The correct standard for overturning a Trial Court's 
findings of fact is "clearly erroneous". In short, the Court would have to find that the 
Trial Court so clearly misconstrued the facts that it was clearly erroneous. This Court 
normally gives deference to the Trial Court which has seen and heard the witnesses and 
their testimony. 
"To successfully challenge an ultimate finding of fact, 'an [Ajppellant must first 
marshal all the evidence in support of the finding and then demonstrate that the evidence 
is legally insufficient to support the finding even when viewing it in a light most 
favorable to the court below."1 Parduhn v. Bennett, 112 P.3d 495 (Utah 2005) (quoting 
Chen v. Stewart, 100 P.3d 1177, 1184 (Utah 2004). A Trial Court's findings of fact will 
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not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. Chen 100 P.3d at 1184. A Trial Court's 
conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness. Khalsa v. Ward, 101 P.3d 843, 845 (Ut. 
Ct. App. 2004) (citing Lovendahl v. Jordan Sck Dist, 63 P.3d 705, 709 (Utah 2002)). 
The burden is on Appellants to present and overturn the Trial Court's Findings of 
Fact. Concerning the Clear Error standard, the Supreme Court has said, "We have no 
business disturbing the District Court's ruling 'simply because we would have decided 
the case differently,' but only if based 'on the entire evidence, [we are] left with the 
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.'" Georgia v. Ashcroft, 
539 U.S. 461,463(2003). 
Ultimately, since Appellants have made no attempt to marshal evidence to 
overturn the Findings of Fact, this Court must necessarily accept those Findings as 
determined by the Trial Court. The judgment in favor of Appellee must stand. 
B. When Interpreting a Deed, the Intent of the Grantor Must Govern. 
Out of care and concern for her daughters, who were single and still residing at 
home, in 1981, Ada R. Craig made arrangements to provide them with some security 
when she passed away. She did so by executing a deed to them as joint tenants with her, 
each of them owning a 1/3 interest. By reserving to herself a life estate, she intended to 
maintain the use and control of the Home during her life. Her care and concern for her 
daughters was not rewarded in kind when she really needed help. 
The Trial Court correctly applied long-standing rules of construction to the 1981 
Deed when it gave the deed meaning consistent with the express language of the deed 
and with Ada R. Craig's intent. This Court has said that while interpreting a deed, the 
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intention of the parties, drawn from the whole deed must govern. Khalsa v. Ward, 101 
P.3d 843, 845 (Ut. Ct. App. 2004). In construing a deed, a court will determine intent 
from the four comers of the document and look to parol evidence if ambiguous. RHN 
Corp. v. Veibell, 96 P.3d 935, 945 (Utah 2004). Utah courts will interpret deeds in the 
same manner as contracts. Holladay Duplex Management Co., L.L.C v. Howells, 47 P.3d 
104, 105 (Ut. Ct. App. 2002). 
The Trial Court determined in its Findings of Fact that Ada R. Craig intended to 
grant unto herself and to her daughters, Sharon Craig and Colleen Erickson,a 1/3 joint 
tenancy interest in the Home. (See Findings of Fact p. 2 fl 2-3). In addition, the court 
found that Ada intended to retain a life estate in the Home. (See Findings of Fact p. 2 f 
3). Ada R. Craig did this with the intent to retain the day-to-day control over the Home 
during her lifetime, and furthermore, to give the Home to her daughters when she died, 
but not prior. (See Findings of Fact p. 3 *[ffl 6-7). 
These findings are consistent with Ada R. Craig's actions. Ada intended to retain a 
possessory interest and from 1981 until 1999 continued to live in, maintain, remodel, and 
improve the residence. (Transcript Volume II, pp. 9-14). Thereafter, she appealed to her 
co-owner daughters to sell the Home so she would have her 1/3 share to use toward her 
living and care expenses. (Trial Exhibit No.7 Tfl[ 2-3). The daughters refused so she 
appointed her eldest son, Robert D. Irvine as her agent to rent the Home and use the rents 
to assist with her abundant health care costs at the Highland Care Center. (Trial Exhibit 
No.8; Transcript Volume II, pp. 18-20). Ada R. Craig was competent and understood her 
needs and desires. (Findings of Fact, p 4, ^Jl 1-13). 
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By construing the 1981 Deed according to its plain language and consistent with 
Ada R. Craig's intent, the Trial Court acted in accordance with long-standing rules of 
deed construction. As stated in paragraph A above, it is the responsibility of Appellants to 
attack the evidence and Appellants have made no effort to rebut the conclusions of the 
Trial Court. 
Interpreting the 1981 Deed otherwise, would work against the manifest best 
interests of Ada R. Craig and would produce unjust results. Ada's undeniable interest 
was that her only substantial asset, her Home, would be preserved as her residence for 
life, or an income for life. The 1981 Deed also assured her and her daughters that they or 
she (Ada) would receive the fee interest at the death of the last survivor while the joint 
tenancy existed. Even the Appellants' testimony corroborates Ada Craig's intent with 
regard to the property. Colleen Erickson testified concerning the 1981 Deed that, 
"Shar[on] had a third and I had a third and my mom had a third, contingent upon the life 
estate of the property." (Transcript, p. 69, line 9-10). 
As it turned out, Ada's retention of a one-third interest was also the only way to 
provide assistance for her living and care costs. Accordingly, the intent of Ada R. Craig 
was—and therefore the Trial Court's determination was—that Ada R. Craig granted to 
herself a joint tenancy interest as well as a life estate. The Trial Court was correct as a 
matter of law, and there was ample support for its factual findings. 
C. Ada R. Craig's Joint Tenancy Interest and Life Estate are Distinct and Separate 
Legally Consistent Property Interests. 
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No one disputes that Ada R. Craig could convey the Home to herself and her 
daughters as joint tenants with right of survivorship. No one disputes that Ada R. Craig 
could convey the Home to her daughters and retain for herself a life estate. Appellants 
argue that she cannot do both at the same time. Appellee did not agree and neither did 
the Trial Court. 
Without citing case law, Appellants argue that a merger occurs when a greater and 
lesser interest in real property are conveyed or retained. However, where the intent of a 
grantor is clear, courts have had no difficulty in allowing the two interests to be given full 
effect. 
Courts have held that a life estate and a tenancy in common are not inconsistent 
estates and can be held in the same person at the same point in time. See United States v. 
Gibbons, 71 F.3d 1496, 1500 (10th Cir. Ct. App. 1995). See also Cole v. Cole, 294 P.2d 
494, 495 (Ca. Ct. App. 1956); Hammond v. McArthur, 183 P.2d 1 (CA. 1947). In 
Hammond, Rowley, a widow, and McArthur, an unmarried woman, acquired certain real 
property as joint tenants. Id. Later, McArthur conveyed to Rowley a life estate in the 
property by deed. Id. Hammond, Rowley's successor, claimed that the conveyance of the 
possessory interest extinguished the joint fee ownership and survivorship rights, claiming 
the rights were inconsistent. Id. McArthur argued that the grant of the life estate did not 
convey to Rowley anything that she did not already possess and that the life estate was 
not repugnant to the rights of survivorship. Id at 3-4. 
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The court found for McArthur and held that when one of two joint tenants in fee 
simple makes a conveyance of his or her interest for life, upon the termination of the life 
interest, the joint tenancy, as it originally existed, revives. Id at 8. 
This is consistent with the finding in United States v. Gibbons. In that case, a 
husband and wife owned a Home as joint tenants. Id. The divorce decree awarded the 
wife a conditional right to live on the property during her lifetime. Id. The court held that 
the wife held a life estate, or possessory interest, in the whole of the property and a 
remainder interest, or tenancy in common interest, of one-half in the property. Id at 1499. 
Although the separation agreement severed the joint tenancy, the wife still maintained a 
simultaneous possessory and remainder interest via a life estate and tenancy in common 
estate in the Home. Id. 
The case at hand is similar. Ada R. Craig intended to grant to herself and to two of 
her daughters a 1/3 fee interest each in joint tenancy with full right of survivorship. Ada 
R. Craig also intended to retain a life estate in order that she could maintain the day-to-
day control, possession and enjoyment of the Home until her death. Appellant, Sharon 
Anderson, understood that this meant she would not receive her interest in the Home until 
her mother passed away. (Transcript p 5, lines 5-10). Colleen Erickson clearly 
understood that her mother owned a one-third interest in the Home. The two estates in 
Ada R. Craig are not incompatible but are legally sustained and are consistent with her 
intent as determined by the Trial Court. Therefore the Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law by the Trial Court must stand. 
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D. Appellants Misstate the Holding of Robinson v. King, the Sole Authority 
Supporting Their Position, 
The Appellants would have the Court use antiquated technicalities to override the 
intent of Ada R. Craig even though misapplied and misconstrued. The bedrock of their 
position (that a habendum clause granting a life estate which accompanies a granting 
clause conveying a fee simple interest in real estate must then limit the grantee's interest 
to a life estate only and no fee interest) is based on a single North Carolina case, 
Robinson v. King. However, Appellants have misunderstood and misstated the holding 
of that case. 
The court in Robinson relied on a previous North Carolina case, Triplett, when it 
said: 
[T]his doctrine, which regarded the granting clause and the 
habendum and tenendum as separate and independent portions of the 
same instrument, each with its especial function, is becoming 
obsolete in this country, and a more liberal and enlightened rule of 
construction obtains, which looks at the whole instrument without 
reference to formal divisions, in order to ascertain the intention of 
the parties, and does not permit antiquated technicalities to override 
the plainly expressed intention of the grantor...." 
Robinson v. King, 314 S.E.2d 768, 772 (N.C. App. 1984) (emphasis added). 
The court further stated, "For forty years after Triplett the North Carolina Supreme 
Court consistently construed deeds according to the overall intent expressed in the 
instrument." Id at 773. The court then concluded that: 
The surrounding circumstances and evidence apart from the 
quitclaim deed are ambiguous at best, and fail to show a clear intent 
on the part of the grantors to convey a fee simple. 
Id at 775 (emphasis added). 
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The court clearly based its holding on a determination of the intent of the grantor 
after reviewing the deed itself, the Last Will and Testament of the decedent and other 
surrounding circumstances. Id at 774. As the holding states at page 775, there was no 
clear intent to grant a fee simple. Id at 775. The court used modern rules of deed 
construction to ascertain the intent of the grantor and did not use antiquated technicalities 
to interpret the deed as Appellants are urging the court to do in the case at hand. 
Appellants also rely on the definition of "Habendum Clause" in the Black's Law 
Dictionary 5th edition to support their position and have quoted this portion in their brief: 
A habendum clause is the clause usually following the granting part of the 
premises of a deed, which defines the extent of the ownership in the thing 
granted to be held and enjoyed by the grantee. The office of 'habendum' is 
properly to determine what estate or interest is granted by the deed, though 
office may be performed by the premises, in which case the habendum may 
lessen, enlarge, explain, or qualify, but not totally contradict or be 
repugnant to, the estate granted in the premises. 
Black's Law Dictionary 5 Edition, page 639 (Appellants' brief page 12) 
(emphasis added). 
A habendum clause is traditionally the "To have and to hold" clause. The granting 
clause in the 1981 Deed which states, "Ada R. Craig, grantor of Salt Lake City, County 
of Salt Lake, State of Utah, hereby Quit-Claims to Ada R. Craig, Sharon V. Craig and 
Colleen R. Craig as Joint Tenants with full rights of survivorship and not as tenants in 
common . . ." grants to Ada R. Craig, and two of her daughters, Sharon Anderson and 
Colleen Erickson, each a 1/3 joint tenancy with full rights of survivorship. As the Black's 
Law definition states, the language afterward, or habendum clause as Appellants label it, 
can lessen, enlarge, explain or qualify but not totally contradict or be repugnant to, the 
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estate granted in the premises. It would be absurd for Ada R. Craig to grant unto herself a 
1/3 joint tenancy interest with full right of survivorship only to take it away directly 
afterward. 
The explanation brought forth by Appellants defies all reason and common sense. 
Furthermore, the Appellants' explanation results in a habendum clause that is 
contradictory or repugnant to the premise or granting clause. The dictionary defines 
repugnant as inconsistent or incompatible. (See Merriam Webster's Online Dictionary). 
To grant a joint tenancy interest and thereafter, take it away only to supplant it with 
something less is clearly inconsistent, contradictory and illogical. Moreover, this would 
be in opposition to the function of a habendum clause, and therefore cannot possibly 
define the intent of the grantor and therefore the 1981 Deed. 
In order to be consistent with the Black's Law definition brought forth by 
Appellants, the habendum clause after the premise or granting clause might say 
something to limit, qualify, or expand the grant. Examples might be "with right to all 
rents" or "with right to exclude all other owners" or "with no alcohol on the premises" in 
order to properly coincide with the Black's Law definition. These are examples of 
language that serve to lessen, enlarge, explain or qualify but not contradict or be 
repugnant to the premise. 
The language immediately following the premise or granting clause in the 1981 
Deed states, "[Rleserving a Life Estate only for Ada R. Craig." (emphasis added). This 
language, if it is a habendum clause, is clearly contradictory and repugnant to the 
granting language. Therefore, the language functions not as a habendum clause, but as a 
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reservation of a life estate in the grantor. If it is a habendum clause, the fact that it 
contradicts logic and the premise itself works contrary to the proper function of a 
habendum clause. As such, it is more likely that the language results in a granting clause 
followed by a reservation if antiquated technicalities are to serve our purposes for deed 
construction. 
Based on the foregoing, the court should look at the intent of the grantor in 
construing the 1981 Deed. Appellants must therefore bring forth enough evidence to 
show clear error by the Trial Court in determining the intent of Ada R. Craig before the 
Trial Court's Findings of Fact can be set aside. To put it bluntly, Appellants have no 
legal authority to support their position and no credible factual evidence to dispute the 
findings of the Trial Court. The Trial Court's findings must stand. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT 
THE APPELLANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO AN 
ACCOUNTING FOR PROFITS AND EXPENSES OF THE 
PROPERTY THROUGH THE PERIOD OF TIME THAT 
ADA R. CRAIG WAS STILL ALIVE. 
Ada R. Craig's nursing Home costs exceeded $5,000.00 per month. Amazingly, 
while not contributing anything to the costs of their mother's care and having received a 
magnanimous gift of two-thirds ownership in the Home, Appellants would now have the 
Court take back the meager rental income Ada received and used to partially fund her 
care. 
Ada R. Craig, at all times, retained a life estate in her Home. Appellants argue 
once again that the Court should ignore her obvious intent and eliminate her life estate as 
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a result of the 1999 deed to Carolyn Abbott. Once again, Appellants argue without legal 
authority and in the face of overwhelming law in favor of Appellee. 
During the continuance of a life estate in real property the life tenant is entitled to 
the possession, control, and enjoyment of the property. 31 C.J.S. Estates § 36 (2005). 
The courts will presume a merger only if equity demands it. Miller v. Martineau & 
Co., 983 P.2d 1107, 1113 (Ut. Ct. App. 1999) (quoting Federal Land Bank v. Colorado 
Nat'lBank, 786 P.2d 514, 515 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989) ("'Equity does not favor the doctrine 
of merger . . . .'").1 
Appellants claim that they are entitled to an accounting of profits and expenses 
because Ada R. Craig conveyed all of her interest in the Home to Carolyn Abbott in the 
1999 deed. In the eyes of Appellants, the life estate and the joint tenancy interest merged 
in Carolyn Abbott contrary to the express language and intent of the deed. As a result, 
they argue that Appellants' interests in the property became present interests on the date 
of the 1999 deed if not before. (See Brief of Appellant pg 17 If 1-2). 
The Quit-Claim Deed dated January 21, 1999 contains the following language, 
"ADA R. CRAIG also known as RAE S. CRAIG ... grantor hereby QUIT-CLAIM[s] to 
CAROLYN ABBOTT grantee the following described tract of land... Reserving to the 
Grantor a life estate" (Trial Exhibit No.2) (emphasis added). 
1
 See alsoMontgomery v. Browder, 930 S.W.2d 772, 781 (Tx. Ct. App. 1996) (Holding that the doctrine of merger of 
estates is not favored, and does not apply where it is the intention of the parties that it should not apply and when it 
is in the interest of the holder of the two estates to keep them separate); Western Bank of Las Cruces v. Malooly, 895 
P.2d 265, 270 (NM. Ct. App. 1995) (Courts will not compel a merger of estates where the party in whom the two 
interests are vested does not intend such a merger to take place, or where it would be inimical to the interest of the 
party in whom the several estates have united). 
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The possessory life estate and joint tenancy interests of Ada R. Craig could not 
have merged in Carolyn Abbot because the deed clearly reserves the life estate to Ada. 
Ada R. Craig retained her possessory life estate interest until she passed away in 2003. 
With her possessory life estate interest, Ada R. Craig retained her right to, "[Possession, 
control, and enjoyment of the property" throughout her lifetime. 31 C.J.S. Estates § 36 
(2005). At no time did Carolyn Abbott, or later Robert D. Irvine, claim ownership or use 
of income derived from rental of the Home. At all times, the rents were used solely for 
the benefit of Ada R. Craig. 
Even if technical rules required that the life estate interest and the joint tenancy 
interest united in Carolyn Abbott, a merger would be contrary to the best interests of the 
grantor because Ada R. Craig needed and attempted to utilize her ownership in the 
property to pay for her health care expenses. Therefore, equity would dictate that no 
merger took place. 
A further technical defect in the argument of Appellants is the dates of ownership 
of Appellee, Robert D. Irvine. Appellants have asked for an accounting form January 21, 
199 through July 11, 2003. Mr. Irvine received a conveyance from his sister, Caroline 
Abbott on May 20, 2002. Thus, prior to that date, he had no ownership rights or control, 
except acting as an agent for Ada R. Craig. If Appellants' arguments were accepted, Mr. 
Irvine, at worst, would owe to Appellants an accounting from May 20, 2002 until July 11, 
2003, when Appellants immediately excluded him from the Home. 
However, we need not pursue this line of thinking further because the plain 
language of the deed clearly reserves a life estate in the grantor, thereby resulting in a 
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conveyance of the joint tenancy interest only to Carolyn Abbott. The Trial Court clearly 
determined the intent of Ada R. Craig with regard to the 1999 deed (a factual 
determination). Appellants have offered nothing to overturn the Findings of the Trial 
Court. As a result, Appellants' request for an accounting of income and expenses of the 
property fails and the holding of the Trial Court must stand. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN APPOINTING ROBERT D. IRVINE AS RECEIVER 
FOR THE SALE OF THE HOME. 
Appellants suffered no harm or prejudice, but they still want to dispute the 
appointment of Mr. Irvine as receiver. However, the Trial Court properly applied its 
discretion when it appointed Appellee as receiver of the property under its direct 
supervision. Mr. Irvine has spent his career buying, selling, managing, and developing 
real property. The sale of a Home under the supervision of the Trial Court seems a 
reasonable task for Mr. Irvine. 
The court bases its authority to appoint a receiver on its inherent equitable power. 
Interlake Co. v. Von Hake, 697 P.2d 238, 239 (Utah 1985) (A receivership is an equitable 
matter and is entirely within the control of the court.) (citing Shaw v. Robison, 537 P.2d 
487, 490 (Utah 1975)). 
"In determining whether to continue a receivership or discharge the receiver the 
court will consider the rights and interests of all parties concerned . . . ." Shaw 537 P.2d 
at 490. A receiver is an officer of the court acting under its direct supervision. Interlake 
Co. 697 P.2d at 240. Therefore, a receiver has limited power and must seek advice from 
the courts. Id. 
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The appointment of a receiver or the refusal to appoint is in the sound discretion of 
the Trial Court and will not be overturned on appeal unless an abuse of discretion is 
shown. Skirvin v. Mesta, 141 F.2d 668, 673 (10th Cir. Ct. App. 1944). See also Milwaukee 
& M.R. Co. v. Soutter, 154 U.S. 540, 541 (1864); Lee v. Farmers Co-Op. Ass'n of 
Mountain View, 113 P.2d 391, 393 (OK. 1941). 
Mr. Irvine was familiar with the property and had managed the property for his 
mother, Ada R. Craig. In addition, Mr. Irvine has vast experience managing property. 
Therefore, Mr. Irvine was the person most able to meet the requirements of a receiver 
under the circumstances. The Trial Court justifiably determined that he was qualified and 
limited his authority to arranging a sale. When Mr. Irvine brought a final sale 
arrangement to the court for approval, Appellants instead asked the court if they could 
jointly purchase the 1/3 interest of Mr. Irvine at the offered price and the Trial Court 
granted their request. 
The Trial Court adequately protected the interests of all parties through its close 
supervision and Mr. Irvine effected a sale. Appellants were unable to demonstrate harm 
or prejudice at trial, and have suffered no harm. They have neither alleged nor shown 
harm to this Court. If there is no harm, then what is the complaint? It may be 
appropriate for this Court to adopt an adage sometimes utilized in athletics, i.e. "No 
Harm - No Foul." Regardless of whether the Trial Court was right or wrong (and 
Appellee does not concede that it was wrong), it is a moot point. The Trial Court gave 
the order, the receiver fulfilled his duty and Appellants now are the fee owners of the 
property. The Court should therefore summarily dismiss this claim. 
IV. APPELLEE PREVAILED AT TRIAL AND IS ENTITLED 
TO RECEIVE FROM APPELLANTS HIS COSTS 
Rule 34(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that upon affirming an 
order or award, the Appellee should be awarded his costs. Appellee has incurred costs 
and expenses which are the subject of this Rule. The Court should award Appellee his 
costs of appeal upon presentation of such costs. 
CONCLUSION 
The Trial Court correctly determined that a deed executed in 1981 created both a 
joint tenancy interest and a possessory life estate Home of the grantor, Ada R. Craig, 
consistent with her intent. The Trial Court determined within its Findings of Fact that 
Ada R. Craig intended to retain both interests in the Home. Long established rules of 
deed construction require that a grantor's intent prevail over antiquated technicalities and 
arbitrary rules of construction. Therefore, a court should not set aside the Trial Court's 
findings unless clearly erroneous, thereby preserving the grantor's intent. Appellants 
have not shown clear error. 
The Trial Court correctly determined that the Appellants are not entitled to an 
accounting of profits and expenses for the period of time Ada R. Craig was still alive. 
The plain language of the 1999 deed clearly granted to Carolyn Abbott the joint tenancy 
interest while reserving a life estate in Ada R. Craig. The Trial Court found that this was 
also consistent with Ada R. Craig's intent to retain the day-to-day control of the property 
until she passed away. Therefore, as the holder of a possessory life estate, Ada R. Craig 
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was entitled to the benefit of possession, enjoyment and rental income from the Home to 
supplement her abundant health care costs until she passed away. 
The Trial Court acted properly within its discretion when it appointed Appellee as 
receiver for the Home. Mr. Irvine was familiar with the Home because he managed it for 
his mother while she received care at Highland Care Center. He had substantial 
experience buying, selling, and maintaining real property. In addition, the Trial Court 
closely supervised every action. Furthermore, Appellants have failed to show any harm. 
However, the issue is moot because the Appellants have purchased the interests of Mr. 
Irvine and are now owners of the Home. 
For all of the foregoing reasons, the holdings of the Trial Court must stand and 
Appellee should receive an award of his costs on appeal. 
Dated this / ^ d a y of October, 2005. 
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Correspondence by Ada R. Craig 











F b u i a j ) ^ , i •'"•' 
Dear Colleen; 
I didn't think I would ever be writing a letter to one of my children pleading for what 
already belongs to me. I now find it necessary to write to two of my children who have taken the 
position that the home that I have owned for over fifty years no longer belongs to me. I have 
provided a comfortable home for both of you for your entire lives. I didn't think that I would 
ever need the services of a care center, but like many others I now find myself in that position. I 
know that you enjoy being comfortable, I too would enjoy being comfortable for the balance of 
my life. I don't need a spacious house, but I would at least like the comfort of a private room of 
my own in this care center. At the time I signed a quit claim deeding one third of my home to 
each of you, I was concerned about Mark's wife causing some kind of a problem that could place 
my house in jeopardy. Also at that time you were single and my other children were married and 
living on their own. There have been many changes since then, both of you are now married like 
my other children and have husbands to see to your needs. I don't have a husband to see to my 
needs, all I have is my home and I need the funds from the sale of my home. It was never my 
intention that each of you receive one third of my home until my death and you know that as well 
as I do. I have never asked for financial help from any of my children and don't intend to start 
now. I worked very hard for many years remodeling and improving my home to make it a good 
home for my family. I spent a lot of money in the process, my money, not yours. 
Sharon you told me you would not sign a quit claim deed back to me because Colleen 
would get mad at you and never let you see little Mark again. Shame on you Colleen for using 
your son as a bargaining chip against your mother. It's becoming very obvious to me that my 
comfort doesn't hold very high priority with either of you. As you are aware Bob now has power 
of attorney over me and all my affairs, and, in that power of attorney any and all prior powers of 
attorney of any nature are revoked and terminated. Bob has asked you both for information and 
papers to assist us in taking care of my affairs. Colleen you told him that you didn't have to give 
him anything. Let me remind you Colleen you are and have been living in my home for 46 years 
using my furniture and my belongings. The items that Bob asked for belong to me, not you. I 
am asking you now to either bring them to me or have them available to be picked up by 
February 8th. The following are the items that I would like: 
1-My 1998 bank statements and checks (copies are available- fi. :- *.i u .r A^( no) 
2-Items from my safety deposit box 
3-My purses and wallet together with credit cards, etc. 
4-My equitable life policy (medical) and card 
5-All my social security information and card 
6-All my 1998 paid bills including medical 
7-Copy of my will 
8-All my medicare information, bills and card 
9-My 1997 income tax copies (federal and state) 
10-My light and magnifying instrument 
11-My hearing aid coupons 
12-Balance of my credit union savings account or an explanation as to the use of the funds 
13-My metal can and its contents 
Please call me and tell me if you are going to bring these or if I need to arrange to have 
them picked up. 
I love all my children and grand children and desire to see them all. My needs have 
changed drastically in just a short while and I need your cooperation. When the funds jfrom the 
sale of my home are no longer needed in my behalf, it is my desire that you will receive your 
share of those funds as was intended when I quit claimed the home to the three of us. 
J^b-es 
Trial Exhibit 8 
Durable Power of Attorney 
of Ada R. Craig 












DURABLE POWER OF ATTORNEY 
jgjflOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS, that I, Ada Rae Craig, have made, constituted 
and appointed and by these presents do make, constitute and appoint Robert Douglas Irvine, my 
true and lawful attorney for me and in ray name, place and stead, giving and granting onto my said 
attorney full power and authority to do and perform all and every act and thing requiisite and 
necessary to be done in connection with my affairs, including, but not limited to, dealing with any 
real or personal property that I may awn or may hereafter acquire; to receive, collect and recover all 
sums of money, debts and accounts due mc; to sue and use all other lawful means to collect all such 
money, debts, and accounts; to compromise all claims by or against me; to pay from my funds all 
of my just debts and obligations; to expend funds for my support and maintenance; to create a 
revocable or irrevocable trust during my lifetime and to transfer my property to the trustees thereof; 
which trust may extend beyond my lifetime; to create and sever joint tenancies of property; and to 
arrange and pay for any medical or nursing home care that I nmy require during my Hfctime, THIS 
POWER OF ATTORNEY SHALL NOT BE AFFECTED BY MY DISABILITY, I hereby ratify 
and confirm all that my said attorney Robert Douglas Irvine may lawfully do and cause to be done 
by virtue of these presents, and I hereby spedficaUy and completely revoke and terminate any and 
all powers of attorney of any nature previously executed and granted by me 
WITNESS WHER EOF, I have hereunto set my hand Mb . "; _  day of January, 1999. 
Ada Rat* Craiv ~j/ 
STATE OF ^ f t g f e > £ . . _ 
COUNTY O F ^ ^ ^ ^ , 
The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this / / day of January, 1999, by 
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1 offered my s i s t e r and I each $10,000 i f we would deed t h e 
2 property to him. 
3 J Q Okay. My question was didn't your sister threaten 
i J you or did she threaten you in any way with not seeing her son 
5 Mark? 
6 f A She did not. 
7 | Q Has your sister ever threatened you to not see her 
S 1 son -
9 I A She had not. 
10 | Q - if you didn't cooperate with her 9 
11 How many years did you live m the house, 
12 approximately with your mother, or from what period of time to 
13 1 what period of time, if that would be easier? 
14 ] A From 1954 to 1997. 
15 | Q You were born when she was living m that house 9 
16 A Yes. 
17 I Q You didn't pay your mother any money for an interest 
18 m the house, did you 9 
19 A No. 
20 Q In your responses to the interrogatories, there was 
21 question asked what you paid for the house and the answer that 
22 was provided was you paid $10, care, love and affection. And 
23 understand the care, love, and affection part, but actually to 
24 be completely accurate you didn't even pay the $10 for an 
25 J interest in the house; isn't that true? 
1 regarding the specific terms of the Will - or excuse me, of the 
2 1981 deed, did she? 
3 A Only that she wanted Colleen and I to have the 
4 property. 
5 Q Now, isn't it true that she wanted you to essentially 
6 inherit that home upon her death? 
7 A That's correct. 
8 Q And your understanding was you wouldn't get that 
$ I inheritance until she died. 
10 A Correct. 
11 Q Did you receive the letter dated February 1999 that 
12 we marked as Exhibit 7 that's before you? 
B A I did. 
14 I Q Did that come m the mail to you9 
15 A Yes, it did. 
16 Q Did you contact your mother m response to the letter 
17 about the ownership interest m the house9 
IS A No, I did not. 
19 Q In fact you didn't object to your mother in any way 
20 about what the ownership interest in response to that letter; 
ZL isn't that true9 
n\ A i -
23 Q You d i d n ' t c a l l y o u r mom up a n d s a y , " T h i s i s n ' t 
2A\ r i g h t . " You d i d n ' t c a l l Bob u p a n d s a y , " T h a t ' s n o t t r u e . " 
25 A My m o t h e r w o u l d n ' t u n d e r s t a n d . I c o u l d n ' t c a l l my 
1 you the property completely, other than her life estate, did 
2 she? 
3 THE COURT: I don't understand the question. 
i\ MR. CARTWRIGHT: Okay. 
5 J Q (BY MR. CARTWRIGHT) Your mom didn't tell you back 
around 1981 that she was signing that deed and by signing that 
deed she was giving away all of her interests, except for her 
life estate? 
A Shar had a third and I had a third and my mom had a 
third, contingent upon the life estate of the property. 
Q Okay, so it was your understanding that, that Sharon 
owned a third of the property. It was a third hers, correct? 
A Well, actually wouldn't become a third of hers. 
Q Well now -
A Well I guess what I'm saying. It is a third. 
Q Okay. 
A Sharon had, did have a third. 
Q All right, so it was your perception that Sharon 
owned a third and you owned a third and your mom owned a third 
arfd when she died you and Sharon would own, together you'd own 
it all? 
A With full rights of survivorship Sharon and I would 
end up with it. 
Q Okay. And before your death you each owned a third? 
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1 A I live at 4931 Fairview Drive, Salt Lake City, 
2 Utah. 
3 Q What's your background or occupation? 
4 A I'm a general contractor. 
5 Q Now you are a son of Ada Irvine, Ada Craig; is that 
6 correct? 
7 A Yes, sir. 
8 Q What I'd like you to do is explain to the Court the 
9 relationship with Ada, with you, the children, and the 
10 defendants and how the family is put together. So if you 
11 could walk over here to the board. Stand up and come over 
12 here. Here's a marker and why don't you start with Ada and 
13 your dad, where the family starts there. 
14 A My mother and father married. Her maiden name was 
15 Ada Rae Snow, later Ada Irvine. They married in I believe in 
16 1935. They had three children. 
17 Q So three children from your mother and Ray? 
18 A Yes. 
19 I Q Did they ultimately divorce? 
20 A Yes. 
21 Q Do you remember approximately when that was? 
22 A I believe that was 1974. 
23 Q This was before the home was purchased that we're 
24 | here talking about today, correct? 
25 | A Yes, that's correct. 
1 Q What's the address of that home, do you recall? 
2 A (Inaudible) 251 East 1700 South, Salt Lake City. 
3 Q How was that home acquired originally? 
4 A My father purchased it. 
5 Q Do you recall approximately when that home was 
6 purchased by your father? 
7 A 1948. 
8 Q Was this before or after the divorce? 
9 A After. 
10 Q Your mom was later remarried; is that correct? 
11 A She was, I believe in 1949. 
12 Q So the home was purchased after the divorce with 
13 Ray but before she subsequently remarried. 
14 A Yes. 
15 Q Who did she remarry? 
16 J A Forrest (inaudible). 
17 Q Write his name down. And to be clear, why don't 
18 you put a line and put Ada next to that too to show they were 
19 married. Did they have - did Forrest and Ada have children 
20 together? 
21 A Yes. 
22 Q Which children dxd they have? 
23 A Mark (inaudible) and Sharon. 
24 Q Write their first names down there. All right. 
25 And what happened to this marriage? 
1 A Forrest (inaudible) passed away in 1979. 
2 Q Okay. Put at the bottom there something like 
3 Forrest died in 1979. Thank you. That's good for now. You 
4 can sit back over here. 
5 Do you know why your father, Ray, purchased the 
6 home for Ada after the divorce? 
7 A Well, he had an ex-wife and three children and she 
8 didn't work and so he was our support. 
9 Q All right. I'd like to direct your attention to 
10 about 1981. Do you recall your mother signing a deed in 1981 
11 on the house that we're talking about? 
12 i A Do I recall her signing a deed? No. 
13 Q Are you aware that she did? 
14 A I am. 
15 Q But you didn't know she signed it? 
16 A No, I did not. 
17 MR. CARTWRIGHT: All right. May I approach? 
18 THE COURT: Of course. 
19 Q (BY MR. CARTWRIGHT) I'm showing you what's been 
20 marked as Exhibit 1 which purports ro be a Quit Claim Deed. 
21 Have you seen this document before? 
22 A I have. 
23 Q In what context have you seen the document? 
24 A Pertaining to my mother's needs for moving into the 
25 care center and this being the only asset that she had. 
1 was $173.68. She was receiving social securxty in the amount 
2 of, I believe $770 or $80 in 1999. It escalated between 1999 
3 and 2003 when she passed away but I believe it was $780 in 
4 1999. 
5 Q So if you take $780 in social security plus 
6 retirement of $173 and the annuity, that's approximately 
7 $1,000 a month. 
8 A Yes, sir. 
9 Q Did she have any other income besides that? 
10 A No. 
11 Q Did your mother, Ada, did there come a time when 
12 she left the home and ended up in the hospital or a care 
13 center? 
14 A Yes. 
15 Q When was that? 
16 A Well, in 1998 she, a couple of times, two or three 
17 times, as a matter of fact was in either a care center or a 
18 rehab area or the hospital. St. Mark's Hospital was 
19 generally the hospital. 
20 Q So she was in St. Mark's Hospital for health 
21 reasons? 
22 A Yes. 
23 Q Do you know what the health reasons were? 
24 I A Well, various health reasons. I think she had some 
25 stomach problems. She had an operation on her stomach at one 
1 point in time, just several reasons, urinary infections 
2 seemed to be quite frequent. 
3 I Q Did she ever go to a psychiatric unit in the 
hospital or anything like that? 
5 I A Not to my knowledge. 
6 Q You mentioned she was in St. Mark's Hospital. What 
7 J happened to her after she left St. Mark's Hospital? 
A She was in St. Mark's Hospital and was then 
9 I discharged to a facility on 700 East I believe called the 
10 Woodland Care Center. She arrived there in the afternoon one 
11 day and I was there as well as the - I don't remember whether 
12 both Sharon and Colleen were there or one but I was there and 
13 they got her situated in a room, there were others in that 
14 room and had her settled down and resting and 1 left that 
15 afternoon- I returned the following morning and she wasn't 
16 there where I'd seen her the previous day. So I went to the 
17 desk and asked where they had moved Ada Craig to, thinking 
18 that they'd moved her to another room or something. They 
19 said no, she's not here any more, she's back in the St. 
20 Mark's Hospital due to a problem that occurred here last 
21 night. 
22 Q A health problem? 
23 A They were a little bit upset with me to begin with. 
24 J They said that her son, Mark, had some by and apparently had 
25 | raised some kind of confusion and ruckus because of what he 
14 
A Yes. 
2 | Q When was that? 
3 | A The 11th of January 1999, a week after she'd moved 
into the Heritage Eastridge. 
5 1 Q So how did you get the authority to make those 
6 I decisions? 
A The first morning that I visited my mother and she 
was so unhappy, in fact she'd hurt herself trying to get into 
use the bathroom, hurt her arm. She just was crying. She 
10 didn't want to be there. She wanted to go back where she had 
11 been to the Highland Care Center and I said, mom, you know, 
12 there's nothing I can do. You've given that authority to 
13 someone else and they're making those decisions for you and 1 
14 can't change that and a lady by the name of Mary Carlson who 
15 worked at the Heritage Eastridge was there and she said, 
16 "Well, Mrs. Craig, you can make a new power of attorney is 
17 you want to. If you don't want to be here you can go to the 
18 Highland -
19 MR. SWENSEN: Objection, Your Honor, hearsay. 
20 THE COURT: Sustained as to what this person at the 
tl care center said. 
22 J Q (BY MR. CARTWRIGHT) So what did your mother do in 
23 response to this conversation? 
24 A She said well then let's change the power of 
25 attorney. 
1 MR. SWENSEN: Objection, Your Honor, hearsay. 
2 MR. CARTWRIGHT: Your Honor, here I'm offering this 
3 testimony to show her intent in entering into this agreement. 
4 THE COURT: I'm going to allow the testimony as to 
5 what was said from any source. It's clearly (inaudible). 
6 Q (BY MR- CARTWRIGHT) I'm showing you what's been 
7 marked as Exhibit 8. 
8 j THE COURT: Exhibit what? 
9 MR. CARTWRIGHT: Exhibit 8. 
10 Q (BY MR- CARTWRIGHT) Have you seen this document 
11 before? 
12 A Yes, sir. 
13 Q What is it? 
14 1 A It's a durable power of attorney. 
15 Q Do you see the signature line on the document? 
16 A I do. 
17 Q Whose name appears there? 
18 A My mother's. 
19 Q Are you familiar with the signature contained on 
20 the durable power of attorney? 
m A Yes, I am. 
22 Q How are you familiar with this signature here? 
23 A Well, ^^ you can see that's considerably different 
24 from the signature that we see on the 1981 deed. As my 
25 mother has gotten older and her health was not as good as it 
19 
1 had been in the past, her signature was not as good as it had 
2 been in the past. 
3 Q So how do you know that it's your mom's signature? 
4 A I watched her sign it. 
5 MR. CARTWRIGHT: I offer Exhibit 8. 
6 THE COURT: Any objection? 
7 J MR. SWENSEN: No objection, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Received. 
9 I (Plaintiff's Exhibit 8 received) 
10 Q (BY MR. CARTWRIGHT) With this power of attorney in 
11 hand, what did you do as far as managing her care? 
12 A Well, that first day that I visited her at the 
13 Heritage Eastridge and she wanted to change the power of 
14 j attorney, I immediately went down to Highland Care Center to 
15 see if there was space available for her and they said that 
16 there was not right at that time but there would be in a 
17 couple of weeks. So I went back and told my mother we'd have 
18 to endure where she was for a couple of weeks and as soon as 
19 | that time concluded we'd be able to move where she wanted to 
20 be. 
21 Q What role did you have in the preparation or the 
22 signing of the power of attorney? 
23 A I contacted an attorney to have it prepared and 
24 called for a fellow to come and be the notary and 1 was there 
25 I as well and asked the lady at the care center if she would 
9 n 
1 witness it -
2 Q How was your mother's eyesight at the time she 
3 signed this document? 
4 I A My mother had macular degeneration which I have 
5 I myself and her eyesight was not wonderful. The man, the 
6 notary that signed it, read it to her. If I were to just 
7 hand it to her, she wouldn't be able to read it without a 
8 magnifying glass. 
9 Q Did your mother express any objections or questions 
ID regarding the power of attorney? 
11 A No. 
12 Q Could you see whether she wanted to sign it or 
13 didn't want to sign it or anything? 
14 A She was anxious to sign it. 
15 Q Why was that? 
1€ A Because she knew she could move and be away from 
17 there. 
18 Q All right. So you ultimately helped her get back 
19 to Highland Ranch? 
20 A Yes. 
21 J Q How did she do once she was back at Highland Ranch? 
22 | A Very good. 
23 | Q How much did Highland Ranch cost? 
2f | A Highland Care Center? 
25 I Q Excuse me? 
21 
A Did you just say Highland Ranch? It's Highland 
Care Center. 
Q Oh, okay, Highland Care. 
A How much did it cost? 
Q Right. 
A When we first moved in the only room that they had 
available was a room where she shared with another lady and 
as I recall it was around $4500 a month. After we were there 
a short time we could see that it would be better if she had 
her own room. My mother had a hearing problem as well and 
she loved her TV. She had a large screen TV and she loved 
her western music, country-western station and for her to 
enjoy it, the sound had to be up a little louder than maybe 
for most. The lady that she shared the room with had 
excellent hearing so that was a problem for her. So we just 
felt we just would be better off if we just had a private 
room for her so that she could live and enjoy the things that 
she wanted. 
Q How much did the private room cost? 
A It was another $700 or $800 a month. I've 
forgotten exactly. 
Q Were there activities for the residents at the 
Highland Care Center? 
A Yes, many. 
Q Did Ada participate in any of those activities? 
of the challenge and my mother enjoyed it there. 
Q Who paid for Highland Care Center costs while she 
was there? 
A I did. 
Q Approximately how much did you spend on your 
mother' s behalf? 
A About $175,000 roughly. 
Q That was over three or four years? 
A Yes sir. I should qualify that and say my wife and 
















Q I'm showing you what's been marked as Exhibit No. 
5. Do you recognize this? 
A Yes. 
Q What is it? 
A That's a list of the expenses that my wife and I 
contributed to her care. On the right-hand side is another 
column where my brother contributed to her care as well, my 
brother Raymond. 
0 Does this contain a record of the - well, how did 
you contribute payments on your mother' s behalf? 
A I just made checks and deposited to her account. 
We wanted everything to go through her account that pertained 
to her. 
Q Are those deposits reflected in these records, in 
Exhibit 5? 
26 
1 A They are. 
2 Q And how did you make expenditures on your mother's 
3 I behalf? 
4 A With her checking account. 
5 Q And those are also reflected in Exhibit 5? 
6 A Yes, they are. 
7 Q Whose handwriting is on the records here? 
8 A This is my handwriting. 
9 MR. CARTWRIGHT: I offer Exhibit 5. 
10 THE COURT: Any objection? 
11 MR. SWENSEN: No objection. 
12 THE COURT: It will be received. 
13 (Plaintiff's Exhibit 5 received) 
14 Q (BY MR. CARTWRIGHT) Could Ada have paid for own 
15 I expenses rather than you doing that? 
16 A With her funds? 
17 1 Q What I mean is, did she have the resources to meet 
18 her needs? 
19 A Only with her home. 
20 Q Did Ada ever discuss with you who she believed 
21 owned the home? 
22 A She felt she owned the home. She thought it was 
23 hers. 
U MR. SWENSEN: Objection, Your Honor, hearsay. 
15 MR. CARTWRIGHT: Again, Your Honor -
1 MR. SWENSEN: Hearsay. 
2 THE COURT: Overruled. I'm going to have to have 
3 I specifics as to what she said, not what he thinks she 
4 thought. There's no foundation for that. 
5 Q (BY MR. CARTWRIGHT) All right. Did you have 
6 conversations with your mother about who owned the home? 
7 A Many times. 
8 Q When's the first time you recall having that 
9 conversation? 
10 A In those first couple of days when we moved from 
11 the Heritage Eastridge down to the Highland Care Center. 
12 Q So when she went back to Highland Care Center for 
13 the second time? 
14 A Yes. 
15 Q And where was your mother when you were there with 
16 her? 
17 A In her room. 
IB Q I said that wrong. Where was your mother when she 
19 made those statements? 
20 I A In her room. 
21 Q Who was there when those statements were made? 
22 I A Oh golly, from time to time there might have been 
23 several different people but primarily myself or - primarily 
24 myself. 
25 Q On how many occasions did you mom - what did your 
28 
1 mom say when she talked about she owning the home? 
2 A Well, she'd say -
3 MR. SWENSEN: Objection Your Honor, this would be 
4 hearsay. 
5 1 THE COURT: Overruled. 
6 Continue. 
7 THE WITNESS: My mother when she married Forrest 
8 Craig truly thereafter, he started remodeling the home and 
9 that went on for 20 years or more, making changes and 
10 improvements and my mother lived through all of that, the 
11 times when the bathrooms were torn up or the kitchen was torn 
12 up or some part of the house and it wouldn't be like a 
13 contractor coming in and do it. He did it as he had time and 
14 they had the funds to do it but my mother participated in 
15 that and she would say many times, that's my home, I'm the 
16 one that got up on the sawhorses and sanded the sheetrock, 
17 I'm the one that helped paint, I'm the one that helped clean 
18 up the mess after all that. That's my home. 
19 Q When did she make those statements? Were those 
20 made during remodeling or when we're talking -
21 A At the Highland Care Center, frequently. 
22 Q Did your mother make a distinction between owning a 
23 one third interest with the life estate or owning a home or 
24 did she talk about that? 
25 A No. 
?9 
1 Q Did she ever talk to you about the 1981 deed that 
2 she'd signed? 
3 A When we talked about how we were going to pay for 
4 her to be at the Highland Care Center, her only asset was her 
5 I home. Of course she expected that the girls in her mind, 
6 that they would deed that back to her. I contacted an 
7 J attorney and he had us get a title report. We got a title 
8 report and that's when we found out that their names were on 
9 the deed. I talked to my mother about it and she said, yes, 
10 she remembered doing that. I guess like most of us, she 
11 probably never thought that that would happen to her like we 
12 don't think it'll happen to us, they'll have a need or we'll 
13 have need for those things in our later life but nevertheless 
14 she needed it and — 
15 Q Let's focus on the time when she discovered or 
16 after you contacted the attorney and you talked specifically 
17 about the terms of the 1981 deed. Do you recall any specific 
18 statements by your mother about the nature of the interest 
19 she held and the daughters held? 
20 A Why it was that way? 
21 j Q Right. 
12 J A I, of course, asked her why it was done and she 
23 1 told me that he son Mark had married just prior to that and 
24 1 that was an unfortunate situation for him. He had married a 
25 | girl who was working in a law firm. I don't know whether she 
30 
1 was a paralegal or at least affiliated with a law firm and 
2 Mark and this girl were going through a nasty divorce and my 
3 mother said they were worried that she would cause them some 
4 grief over this house. That's what I was told by my mother. 
5 Q Did the specific context of how much the daughters 
6 owned as compared to her, what she owned ever come up in 
7 1999? 
8 A Just that she owned a third of the house plus the 
9 life estate, the right to use the house, she couldn't 
10 I mortgage it or sell it but she had the right to use it or 
U rent it. 
12 I Q All right. So she mentioned she owned a third of 
13 the house. Did she ever say that she didn't own anything 
14 other than a life estate or did she make any statements like 
15 I that? 
16 | A No, no. She felt it was her home. 
17 THE COURT: I'm sorry, sir? 
18 THE WITNESS: She said it was her home. 
19 Q (BY MR. CARTWRIGHT) Did you or your mother take 
20 any actions to obtain funds out of the home for her care? 
21 A Yes. We had an attorney contact - Colleen and 
22 Sharon had an attorney by this time- When we moved my mother 
23 i into the Highland Care Center , number one, that very day, 
24 | Sharon said to me we need to sell the home and I said that's 
25 good idea. That's basically what was said. 
-31 
if Q When you refer to Sharon, you're talking about one 
2 of the defendants? 
3 I A The daughter, Sharon, yes. Please ask the question 
4 I again. 
5 Q I've forgotten what I asked. I've forgotten where 
i\ I was at so let me start over there. You were talking about 
7 obtaining funds to pay for her care. You talked about 
8 Sharon's statement. What did Sharon say? 
SI A We were standing in the hall — 
K M MR. SWENSEN: It's hearsay again. 
fl THE COURT: Pardon me? 
12 MR. SWENSEN: Hearsay. 
13 THE COURT: As to your client? 
14 MR. SWENSEN: Yes. 
15 I THE COURT: Overruled. 
K MR. CARTWRIGHT: Go ahead. 
17 THE WITNESS: We were standing in the hall. We had 
£B J ]ust moved our mother down there. I was there, my wife was 
if-1 there, my two sons, Sharon and her husband were there. They 
S3 j assisted, helping us take mother down to the Highland Care 
fl Center. Sharon was pleased and happy that that was happening 
U because now mom was going to be happy where she was. Of 
S3 course we knew that Highland Care Center was going to expect 
S| j to be paid and Sharon just said, "We need to sell the house," 
"25 \ and I said "That would be a good idea" and that's what was 
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1 said. 
2 Q (BY MR. CARTWRIGHT) Did you follow through with 
3 Sharon on selling the house? 
4 A Yes, we talked about it and I got a call from 
5 Colleen, telling me never to call Sharon again, never talk to 
6 her again. 
7 Q Did she say why? 
8 I A In between all the words that I was hearing, I 
9 don't recall that she said why. 
10 Q You don't need to say the words but can you be more 
11 specific about what you talked about? 
12 A She spent most of her time just calling me names 
13 and telling me what she thought of me and so on. 
14 Q Did you ever participate in a Quit Claim Deed from 
15 your mother to Carolyn regarding the property? 
16 A I did. 
17 Q Tell me what happened with regard to this 
18 t r a n s a c t i o n . 
19 A Well, when we talked to mother and explained to her 
20 the problem with the ownership of the home, she thought that 
SI - she said that the girls would be willing to sign it over 
22 which they were not but we contacted an attorney and he 
23 reviewed the title report and said, well, she owns a third of 
24 the house plus the right to use it. She can either live in 
25 the house or she can rent the house but she can't sell the 
33 
f house and so we talked about it and decided, well, maybe we 
better rent the house and at least get some return to help 
pay toward mother's expenses. 
Q I'm showing you what's been marked as Plaintiff's 
Exhibit No. 2. Do you recognize that document? 
A I do. 
Q What is it? 
A It's a Quit Claim Deed from my mother to Carolyn 
| Abbott, my sister. 
Q Do you know who prepared this deed? 
A It was prepared by Larry Moore at Ray, Qumney and 
Nebeker. 
Q This deed has a date at the bottom of January 21, 
| 1999A is that when you recall it being prepared? 
A I believe so. 
Q Do you see a signature at the bottom of the deed? 
A My mother's signature, yes. 
Q Did you see her sign that? 
A I did. 
MR. CARTWRIGHT: I offer Plaintiff's Exhibit 2. 
THE COURT: Any objection? 
MR. SWENSEN: No objection, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Received. 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 2 received) 
Q (BY MR. CARTWRIGHT) Why was the property deeded to 
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1 Carolyn? 
2 A Larry Moore advised my mother and I that she could 
3 J salvage the one third of the house and probably ought to deed 
4 j it to another party and he said, Bob, you probably ought to 
5I encourage your mother not to deed it to you because you have 
I I power of attorney and it would appear as though you were 
?{ trying to take a part of her house and he said, you have 
Si other brothers and sisters and I said, yes, I have a brother 
Si Ray and a sister Carolyn. My brother lives in California, my 
ID 1 sister lives m Salt Lake. And he said I'd advise her to 
II 1 deed it to your sister. So we talked to mother about it and 
lit she said that would be fine, that's what we ought to do and 
II ] so that's what happened. 
ii } Q Who was present at the time that Ada signed the 
II j Quit Claim Deed to Carolyn? 
II) A Myself, of course my mother and myself and Daryl 
17 Thaxton who is a notary public. 
18 [ Q Anyone else in the room that you remember? 
IIj A I don't remember anyone else being in the room, 
IB I whether there was a nurse's aid or not I don't recall. They 
FM were always in or out but I don't recall anyone else. 
2ZI Q Do you remember approximately what time of day it 
Zlj was when she signed it? 
2*\ A Oh golly, I don't. 
251 Q Do you remember Ada's demeanor at the time she 
1 35 
1 I signed t h e d e e d 9 
2 I A She was f i n e . 
3 I Q How did she know what she was signing if she had 
4 d i f f i c u l t y r e a d i n g ? 
5i A It was read to her. 
6 Q Difficulty seeing9 
7 1 A It was read to her. 
8 Q Do you recall who read the deed to her? 
9 A I believe I read the Quit Claim Deed to her. 
10 I Q Could you tell whether your mother knew where she 
11 was? 
12 A Oh, she knew where she was. 
13 J Q Could you tell whether she knew what she was doing9 
14 A She knew what she was doing. 
15 | Q How could you tell? 
16 A My mother was sharp. 
17 Q Was she sharp on the day she signed the deed? 
18 A Yes, she was. 
15 Q Now, you ultimately received an interest m the 
t0 house; is that correct9 
21 A I did. 
22 Q Could you explain how that happened? 
23 A Well, three years later, I believe three years 
24 later, my sister Carolyn because we'd never gotten any 
25 cooperation from the others, we continued to pay for mother's 
36 
1 care and Carolyn said, A'You ought to have that portion of the 
2 house, Bob." And so she deeded it to me. 
3 Q Did you pay any money for that? 
4 A No. 
5 Q Did Carolyn pay any money to Ada for the Quit Claim 
6 Deed that went to her? 
7 A No. 
8 Q What was the understanding - well, are you aware of 
9 what Ada's understanding was of why she was signing her 
10 interest away to Carolyn? 
31 A She was signing her interest away to protect it, 
12 frankly with the intent of all of the girls signing it all 
13 back to her so that we could use those funds to care for her. 
14 J Q Now, how do you know that's what your mother's 
15 I intentions were9 
1€ A Because we discussed it, talked about it. 
17 Q I'm showing you what's been marked as Plaintiff's 
IS j Exhibit No. 3. Do you recognize that document? 
IS A I do. 
& Q What is it? 
-21 I A It's a warranty deed from my sister Carolyn to me 
|2 J for the third of the property that had been deeded from my 
13 mother to her. 
2i \ Q Do you see the signature down there that says 
25 Carolyn Abbott below it? 
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1 A I do 
2 Q Do you know whose signature that is? 
3 A My sister Carolyn's. 
4 Q How do you know that9 
5 A Well, I was there to witness it. I saw her sign 
6 her it. 
7 I MR. CARTWRIGHT: I offer Plaintiff's Exhibit 3. 
THE COURT: Any objection9 
9 1 MR. SWENSEN: No objection. 
10 THE COURT: Received. 
11 (Plaintiff's Exhibit 3 received) 
12 Q (BY MR. CARTWRIGHT) Do you know whether your 
13 mother ever contacted her daughters either orally or in 
14 writing regarding everyone's claims to the property9 
15 A Yes, she did. She contacted them both orally and 
16 in writing. 
17 1 Q Let's talk about the oral part first. Do you 
18 recall any specific occasion when Ada contacted Sharon or 
19 Colleen? 
20 A Well, she talked to them on the telephone several 
21 times and would ask and they didn't want to talk about it. 
22 They said it was a problem they didn't want to discuss. 
23 I Q Now how do you know that she called them? 
24 I A I was there a time or two when she had but she 
25 I would tell m e about the calls as we l l . 
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1 A February 2 n d, 1999. 
2 Q Could you turn to Page 2 of that? What does that 
3 say in the handwriting on Page 2? 
4 A All my love, mom. 
5 Q Do you know whose handwriting that is? 
6 A That's my mother's. 
7 Q How do you know that? 
8 A I watched her sign it. 
9 I Q Would you explain how this letter came to be? 
10 A As I mentioned a moment ago, she wasn't making any 
11 progress in talking to them and so we discussed maybe writing 
12 a letter and sending it to them so that she could have some 
13 of these things that she wanted and needed and discuss how 
14 her affairs needed to be taken care of. That's how it came 
15 about. 
16 Q On the first page of the letter, m almost the 
17 middle of the first paragraph, there is a sentence that 
IS begins, "At the time" do you see that? 
19 A Say that again. 
20 Q "At the time I signed". Could you read that 
21 sentence out loud please? 
22 A "At the time I signed a Quit Claim deeding one 
23 third of my home to each of you I was concerned about Mark's 
24 wife causing some kind of a problem that could place my house 
25 in jeopardy. " 
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1 Q Do you know what that sentence refers to? 
2 A Well, just as I mentioned earlier, Mark has married 
3 a girl that had looked for a law firm and they were going 
4 through a nasty problem and I don't know whether it was my 
5 mother's idea or Colleen or Sharon's idea to do this deed but 
6 the story that I was told by my mother was that there was 
7 concern about Mark's wife or ex-wife-to-be getting involved 
$ in the house and causing some problems for them. 
S- Q All right. Now the letter I see is typed and I 
10 assume your mother didn't type it? 
11 A No, she did not. 
12 Q Explain how this went from your conversation to the 
13 final form. 
U A Well, my mother and I composed the letter there in 
15 i her room and then my son Scott typed it for her. 
16 Q Then what did Scott do with the type written note? 
IT A He gave it back to - I don't know whether he gave 
IS it to me or my mother but then we read it and reviewed it and 
15 my mother approved it and signed it. 
20 Q Do you recall any specific comments your - who read 
21 it after it was typed up? 
22 A I believe my son read it and I believe I read it as 
23 well. 
24 Q I mean-























Q Oh, to her? 
A Uh-huh (affirmative). 
Q Do you remember any specific comments that your mom 
had once it was read to her by either you or Scott? 
A No, she was satisfied with it and as you can note 
by the way she signed it, all my love, mom, my mother loved 
all of her children and grandchildren. 
Q Do you know what happened to this letter after your 
mother signed it7 
A We mailed it certified mail to Colleen and Sharon 
and then their attorney asked for copies and he was given 
copies as well. 
MR. C/ARTWRIGHT: Okay. Offer Exhibit 7. 
THE COURT: Any objection? 
MR. SWENSEN: No objection, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Received. 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 7 received) 
Q (BY MR. CARTWRIGHT) You had mentioned earlier 
to sell the house or their interest in the house or whatever. 
A Right. 
Q Do you recall any response of your mother 
specifically to Sharon not agreeing to convey whatever 
interest in the house? 
A She said, "I could understand Colleen acting this 
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it way but I can't understand Sharon treating me this way/' 
i] Q In regards to your sister, Carolyn, do you owe her 
It any money? 
tt A No. 
5 Q Owe her any debts or obligations at all? 
if A No. 
3 J Q Does she owe anything to you? 
A No. 
Q Has your mother Ada ever told you that, other than 
her life estate, she gave the rest of the interest in the 
IIJ house to anyone9 
A No. 
MR. CARTWRIGHT: That's all I have. 
THE COURT: Cross examination. 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR. SWENSEN: 
Q Mr. Irvine, I just have a couple of questions to 
13 [ clarify some points here. 
A Okay. 
Q In the diagram that you've put on the board you 
indicated that the divorce occurred in 1944. My recollection 
is you said the house was purchased in 1945. 
A M 8 . 
Q 1948? 
A I'm sorry, M 8 . 
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Q Did he know your mother had a home? 
A Yes, I told him that she did. 
Q So you broached the subject with him about your 
mother' s home? 
A Yes, uh-huh (affirmative). My mother and I had 
talked about it, so I explained to him my mother had a home 
and we had the need of taking care of her now and what were 
we to do? 
Q And what was the object there? So that you could 
assist your mother — 
A Sell the home, yes. 
Q If the intent then was to sell the home, why did 
your mother convey her third interest to Carolyn? 
A At the advice of Larry Moore, that to protect that 
third interest she could deed that to another one of her 
children or someone else and salvage that third. It appeared 
that the others were not going to participate so it was his 
advice. 
Q Okay, sell (inaudible)? 
A Hopefully that we could have sold that one third 
and they would have bought it out, that they would have 
bought that third from their mother. 
Q Okay. If the object was to use the home for Ada's 
support, why didn't she receive any consideration for the 
conveyance to Carolyn? 
I A That's what I was told. 
t[ Q Do you know when he was divorced? 
3 A I don't recall. 
4 f Q Do you know when he was married? 
5| A I don't. 
Q Do you know if he was even married at this time? 
II A No I don't. 
%\ MR, SWENSEN: Thank you, Mr. Irvine, that's all. 
THE COURT: Redirect? 
L(M MR. CARTWRIGHT: Just one issue, 
ft J REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
II j BY MR. CARTWRIGHT: 
IS j Q In regards to when the property was quit claimed 
from Ada to her daughter Carolyn, was Carolyn buying that 
15 I property? 
T£ j A No, she was not buying it. 
Bj Q Why did it go to her? 
UH A In hopes that we would be able to sell that portion 
B\ of the home to acquire funds for my mother's care. 
MR. CARTWRIGHT: That's all. Thank you. 
Hf THE COURT: Anything further Mr. Swensen? 
MR. SWENSEN: Yes Your Honor, just a clarification 
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Defendants. 
The above-entitled matter was tried to the Court, the Honorable Timothy R. 
Hanson, sitting without a jury on September 28 and 29th, 2004. The plaintiff, Robert D. 
Irvine, was represented by John Burton Anderson and Joe Cartwright. The defendants, 
Sharon Craig Anderson and Colleen Craig Erickson were represented by James G. 
Swensen, Jr. The Court heard the testimony of a number of witnesses, received and 
reviewed numerous written exhibits, and evaluated the arguments of counsel. The Court 
announced its decision on this case on October 14, 2004. Being fully advised and 
FILED DISTRICT C0UHT 
Third Judicial District 
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1 
pursuant to Rule 52 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and based upon such testimony 
and evidence, the Court makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. There were two main issues presented at trial by the parties to the Court. 
First, what interest, if any, did Ada R Craig ("Craig") have in the real property after 
executing the January 19, 1981 deed; and second, if Craig owned a joint tenancy interest 
in the real property following the execution of the January 19, 1981 deed, was she 
competent to transfer her interest in the property to her other daughter, Carolyn Abbott. 
2. Based upon the strict application of the words of the deed, the Court finds 
that Ada R. Craig conveyed to herself and to her daughters Sharon Craig Anderson and 
Colleen Craig Erickson the property in joint tenancy, with full rights of survivorship, and 
in addition to her one-third joint tenancy interest, Craig also granted to herself a life 
estate in the real property. 
3. The Court also finds that Ada Craig intended to grant under herself and to 
her daughters a joint tenancy interest in the property, and addition to her one-third joint 
tenancy interest, Craig also intended to grant to herself a life estate in the real property. 
4. There was not any believable or persuasive evidence that Ada Craig 
intended to abandon control of the day to day operations or control of the property while 
Ada was alive. The evidence suggests that she intended to retain control over the 
property. 
5. Following the execution of the 1981 deed, Ada Craig, Sharon Anderson 
and Colleen Erickson shared a one-third interest in the totality of the property as joint 
tenants, with rights of survivorship. 
2 
6. Ada Craig retained a joint tenancy interest so that if one or both of her 
daughters predeceased her, a share or all of the property would return to Craig, and not go 
to another family member of the co-owner daughters. She was interested in giving the 
property to her daughters if she died, but was not interested in giving the property to one 
of her daughters' heirs if a daughter predeceased her. She therefore intended to retain a 
joint tenancy interest in the property. 
7. The life estate Craig retained in addition to her joint tenancy interest was 
also retained for another important purpose: By creating a life estate only for herself, Ada 
intended to retain day-to-day control of the property. The "reserving a life estate only" 
language in the 1981 deed was intended to reserve the life estate only in the name of Ada, 
and not in the name of her daughters, which excludes her two daughters from control of 
the property while Ada Craig was alive. 
8. The evidence shows that Ada Craig said she owned the property following 
the 1981 deed, and also that Colleen Erickson testified that this was a l/3rd, l/3rd, l/3rd 
ownership relationship between Ada, Colleen Erickson, and Sharon Anderson. Other 
witnesses who testified for plaintiff supported this interpretation of Ada Craig's 
ownership intent. 
9. Whether one looks to Ada's intent, or looking at the actual language of the 
1981 deed, the result is the same, as specified above. 
10. The Court finds that to the extent a joint tenancy interest and a life estate 
interest might somehow be inconsistent, which the Court does not believe they are, the 
joint tenancy estate is the greater estate than the life estate in this circumstance, and the 
life estate would therefore merge into the joint tenancy estate. 
3 
11. Defendants have the burden of proving their claim by a preponderance of 
the evidence that Ada Craig was not competent to execute the Quit Claim Deed from Ada 
Craig to Carolyn Abbot on January 21, 1999 or the Last Will and Testament of Ada Craig 
dated February 10, 1999. 
12. The evidence does not support defendants' claims that Ada Craig was not 
competent in the signing of the 1999 documents. This evidence is presented by credible, 
independent, third-party witnesses, who did not demonstrate any bias or pecuniary 
interest. Such witnesses have shown that when the 1999 documents were signed, Ada 
Craig was mentally competent. She was active in the health care center activities, was 
able communicated her needs and desires, was mentally sharp, and did not demonstrate 
confusion during the periods of time the 1999 documents were signed. 
13. There is compelling evidence that supports the conclusion that Ada Craig 
was competent, and no compelling evidence that she was not competent when she signed 
the 1999 documents. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Based upon the foregoing findings of fact, the Court makes the following 
Conclusions of Law: 
1. Ada Craig conveyed to Carolyn Abbott her one-third joint tenancy interest 
in the real property located at 251 E, 1700 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, and Carolyn 
Abbott subsequently transferred this one-third interest to plaintiff Robert Irvine. 
2. The January 21,1999 Quit Claim Deed signed by Ada Craig to Carolyn 
Abbot and the February 10, 1999 Last Will and Testament are valid, legal instruments 
and express the will of Ada Craig to dispose of her property as she intended. 
4 
3. Defendants' claim that the 1999 documents should be set aside based upon 
a lack of competency is not supported by the evidence, and such claim is dismissed. 
4. The real property jointly owned by plaintiff and defendants should be 
partitioned and be sold. 
5. Plaintiff Robert Irvine should be appointed as Receiver to take reasonable 
and proper steps to make sure the property is in a sellable condition, sell the property, and 
divide the net sales proceeds between each of the three owners. Whatever reasonable 
expenses are necessary to make the property sellable for the benefit of each of the parties 
should be deduced from the sales proceeds, and the balance should be divided equally 
between Robert Irvine, Sharon Craig Anderson, and Colleen Craig Erickson. 
6. Each party is to bear their own attorney's fees incurred in connection with 
this action. 
7. Plaintiff is entitled to Rule 54B costs. 
8. Defendants' counterclaims are dismissed. 
9. There is no evidence supporting an Order for Accounting as requested by 
defendants, and such request is therefore denied. However, Robert Irvine shall provide 
an accounting as to the sale of the real property and distribution/)f the proceeds. 
DATED this if day ofJ^^Sf&er, 2004. 
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COLLEEN CRAIG ERICKSON, ; 
Defendants. ] 
I MOTION FOR COURT APPROVAL OF 
) REAL PROPERTY 
) (Expedited Ruling Requested) 
i Civil No. 030920001 
I Judge Hanson 
Robert Irvine, as Trustee and Receiver of the real property subject to this action, 
respectfully submits this motion for Court approval of the sale of the real property under 
the terms specified below. 
FACTS 
1. This Court has appointed Robert Irvine as receiver of the property and 
directed Mr. Irvine to sell the property and divide the proceeds equally between the 
parties in this action. 
T; : : u^fwc? CGURI 
l A ' A K E DEPARTMENT 
C£®UTY CLERK 
2. Mr. Irvine obtained an appraisal of the property, and the appraisal showed 
an approximate value of $220,000. 
3. Mr. Irvine has worked diligently to market the property, and received an 
offer to buy the property. After offers and counteroffers, the agreed upon purchase price 
of the property will be Two Hundred Twelve Thousand Five Hundred Dollars 
($212,500.00). A copy of the Real Estate Purchase Contract reflecting this agreement is 
attached hereto as Exhibit A. 
4. Based upon the appraisal, the condition of the property, and the general 
market in Salt Lake City, Mr. Irvine believes that the pending offer is a good and fair 
price for the sale of the real property. 
Based upon these facts, Mr. Irvine requests that the Court approve the pending 
sale of the property as reflected in the attached Real Estate Purchase Contract. 
REQUEST FOR EXPEDITED RULING 
Because time is of the essence on this pending sale, Mr. Irvine requests an 
expedited ruling to approve the sale. 
Dated this 4th day of February, 2005. 
CARTWRIGHT LAW FIRM, P.C. 
irtwright, Attorney for 
Robert Irvine 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 4th day of February, 2005,1 served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document upon the person(s) named below by placing such 
document in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the following: 
James G. Swensen, Jr. 
Swensen & Andersen, PLLC 
136 South Main St., Suite 318 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
And also by faxing a copy of this motion to Mr. Swensen at (801) 36w510 
Joe C^rtwnght 
Feb 02 05 05:54p John r r t o n anderson 1 801 7^5 5770
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l " F * D C A f C C T A T C D H b r U A C C T O i M T f t A ^ T 
• 5^fl T H I* ** * l*3e'br Urtdlng contract Utah tew rfqufreti reel estate * • * * * « * • to u«» Oil* form. 6uy*r and Stlttr, 
L J J 9 fce*«ver. may agr«» to «lt«r or dtfeta Its provWont or to tft* a *te*ra«f form. If you tfaalr* Itgsl or t*x edvtaa. 
•^ »«— consist your attorney or tax adviser. 
EARNEST MONEY RECENT 
Buyer June Skolfifnysborg offers to purchase the Property d$?2?*bed below mnd hereby delivers to tha Brokeraga, ae 
Earnest Money, tha amount of S2X2QQL to the form of pprsgr^f cftffift which, upon Acceptance or this offer by aK parties 
(as defined In Section 23), than be deposited in accordance with stele taw. 
Rec*v«Jby: < ^ f t t Q 0 ^ W l M - on V £ * ? • . / • * = > m , ^ 
KJ I  i  ,   i  i  o 
toafoft of £ *mt« Monty) 
Btofcerane: Lewis Wofcotf & PQfTfetiSrVBra;v^h Phone Mumper: CQ1 -467~21 QQ 
OFFER TO PURCHASE 
1. PROPERTY: 2S1E17QQ gQUth efso described as: Tf l* ICtf 16.18,161.01? City of Salt lafrft City County of 
Salt Laft$ Stale of Utah. ZIP 841,13 («he •Property'). 
1,1 Included Name, Unless excluded herein, this vale include* the following items if presently owned and attached to 
the Property: plumbing, heating, air conditioning fixture* and equipment; Getting fens; water heater; buttHn appliances; 
light fixtures and buibs; bathroom fixtures; curteine. draperies and rods; window end door screens; Storm doors and 
windows: window blinds; awnings; installed television antenna; satellite dishes and system; permanently affixed carpels; 
automatic garage door opener and accompanying transmitters); fencing; »od trees m^d shrubs. The following items shall 
also be Included In this sale end conveyed under separate Bill of 5*le with warranties as to title: Z Wf)Qg?r ^ 
refrigerators. 2 tf shwashgr - gH items *$ s$on in property on 1.23.Q5 
%JZ Excluded Heme, The fotfowf ng Kerns are exciuveC from fob *t»e: N/A 
1,3 Water Rights. The following water rights are included In this sale: all appurtepant rights to the propflrty 
2. PURCHASE PRICE The purchase price for the Property is S2Q5QQP 
2.1 Method of Payment. The purchase price w» be paid as follows: 
S2QQQ (a) Earnest Money Oeposlt. Vnder certain conditions d«scrlbed m this Contract, THI8 
DEPOSIT MAY BECOME iOTALLY HON-REPUNaABLE. 
•-f t fcWgflQ (b) New Lean. Buyer egrees to sppfy for e new loan as provided in Section 2.3. Bw0r will apply for 
^ V ) \ \ o l X rrrF"**^<*V*tallowingkxms: PC]CONVENTIONAL [ JFHA ( }VA 
^ 1 1 OTHER (specify) _ _ _ . -
If an FHA/VA loan epplles. aee attached FHA/VA Loan Addendum. 
If tha loan Is to Include any particular terms, then check below end give details: 
[ ] SPECIFIC LOAN TERMS : 
(c) Loan Assumption Addendum (see attached Assumption Addendum, if applicable) 
(d) Seller Financing (see attached Seller Financing Addendum, If applicable) 
(e) Other (specify). 
\ 3^\ 0(X)*£fiS8fl (0 BManca of Purchase Price ft Cash at Settlement 
^ * S20S000 PURCHASE PRICE. Total-fM7*?{.) ,hr^^(f) 
22 Financing Condition, (check applicable box) 
(a) [X] Buyer's obligation to purchase the Property 13 conditioned upon 8uyer qualifying for the applicable loan($) 
referenced In Section 2.1(b) or (c)(the "Loan"). This condition Is r^tarr^d to as *»e "Financing CondWon." 
(b) I J Buyer's obligation to purchase the Property IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer quellfylng for a loan. Section 2.3 
does not apply. 
2.3 Application for Loan. 
(e) Buyer's duties. No later than the Losn Application & Fee DesdMne referenced m Section 24(a), Buyer shall apply 
for the Loen. "Loan Application" occurs only when Buyer has: <l) completed, signed, and delivered to tha lender (the 
"Lender"*) the initial loan application and documentation required by ih& Lender, and (R) paid all loan application fees 99 
required by the Lander. Buyer agrees to diligently work to obtain the Losn. Buyer will promptly provide the Lander with 
any additional documentation as required by the Lender. 
(b) Procedure If Losn Application Is denied, if Buyer receives written notice frcm the Lender that the Lender does 
Psgs 1 or C nag** Se»cf»initial* Of aA-^ Date. QQ Date \UKjtf 
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rot approve tha toon (a "Notice of Loan Denial-), Buyer sban, no late/ than tnree caienoar oeys mereane'. P'ujjide u <topy 
10 3ener. Buyer or Sener may, wnbin inree calendar d<»y» »ilw« Scnvv r«c««p« ^ » sucr* *;G«C«, c«n*C3: :n;s u^n^cc vy 
- - - . . - ~ .~ *> *i *.. : - -.: s „5 !:«.«!;.* . . . ^ r «.•*!* ^su-H.-w 2 ?t/hV ff i !t 1hft Nftfs&S ftf LOST? 
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Deposit sho'i bo returned *o Buyer (ll) If tho Notice of Loan Oenia! was received by Buyer after that date, th* Earnest 
Money Deposit shall be released to Seder, ^nd Seller agrees to accept as Setter's exclusive remedy the Earnest Money 
Oeposlt as liquidated damages. A failure to cancel as provided in this Section 2.3(b) shall have no effect on the Financing 
Condition set forth In Section 2.2(a). Cancellation pursuant to the provisions of eny other section of this Conirad shaft be 
governed by sucn other provisions. 
2.4 Appraisai Condition* Buyer*"* obligation io purchase the Fsupviiy |/%j IS £ j »« NOT conditions^ %ipon Xrzt 
r-iw|fvtty <»ppi ««*u «ty tv/t iiw« M M U M I I M»O r w»vt»o«v « MV«». «•••• ww«»%»«.w«i •« t*,t«,*.w«* »>r «••»• %»»>* # «r*r*-**'•»*«• —.—•••—— ~ . -
Appraisal Condition applies znd tho Buyer receives written notice from the Lender that the Property has appraised for lees 
then the Purchase Prfce (a "Notice Of Appraised Value"), Buver may cancel this Coniract by providing a copy of such 
written notice to Seller no later than three days after Buyer's receipt of such written rtotioe. In the event of 9 cancellation 
under this Section 2,4: (I) If the Notice of Appraised Value was received by Buyer no later than the Appraisal Deadline 
referenced in Section 24(e). the Earnest Money Deposit shall be returned to Buyer. (n) If the Notice Of Appraised Value 
was received Dy Bifyw after that dale, the Earnest Money Deposit shai be released to Seller, and Seller agrees to accept 
as Salter's excWve remedy, the Earnest Money Deposit as liquidated darncses. A failure to cancel ss provided in this 
Section 2.4 shell be deemed a werver of the Appraisal Condition by Buyer. Cancellation pursuant to tha provisions of env 
other section of this Contract 9h*u be governed by <i:sh othor provisions 
3. SETTLEMENT AND CLOSING. Settlement shad take place on the Setttement Deadline referenced to Section 24(f), or 
on a date upon which Buyer and Seller agree In writing. "Settlement? shall occur only when ell of the following have been 
completed; (a) Buyer and Seller have signed and delivered to each other or to the escrow/closing office elf documents 
required by this Contract, by the Lender, by written escrow Instructions or by applicable law; (b) any monies required to be 
paid by SKiyer under these documents (excepffor the proceeds of any new loan) hava been delivered by Buyer to Selier 
or to the escrow/closing office in the form of collected or cleared funds; end (c) any monies required to be paid by SeHer 
under these documents have been defivarod by Seller to Buyer or to tha escrowfdosing office in the form of collected or 
cleared funds. Seltar and Buyer shall each pay one-half VA) of the fee charged Dy the escrow/closing office for its 
servicee In the setUemenVdosIng process. Taxes and asseeements for the current year, rents, and interest on assumed 
obligations shall be prorated at Settlement as set forth in tdis Section. Tenant deposits (ine'vding, but not limited to, 
security deposits, cleaning depoelts and prepaid rents) shall be paid or credited by Svltet to Buyer at Settlement. 
Prorations sot forth In this Section shall be made as of the Settlement Deadline date refarenced In Section 24(f), unless 
otherwise agreed to In writing by the parties. Such w/ttag <**&<* Incase the sememes statement The transaction will be 
considered dosed when Settlement has been completed, and whan all of the following have been completed: {I) the 
proceed* of a<\y new loan have been delivered by the Lender to Seller or to the escrow/dosing office; and (K) the 
eppllcabla Closing document* have been recordad In tha o'fica of tha county recorder. The actions described In parts (i) 
and (U) of the preceding sentence shall be completed within four calendar days of Settlement 
4. POSSESSION, Seller shall deliver physical possession to Buyer within: [ J hours [ | days after 
doming; [XJ Other (specify) R E C O R D I N G 
5. CONFIRMATION OF AGENCY DISCLOSURE. At Iho signing of th * Centred. 
( / ^ M Seller's frWf Is Is [ ^ ] Bayer's Initials 
The Listing AoenL gaf]rjfg fjfrlftn / Launie Belnao. represents [X] Sellar ( J Buyer ( ] both Buyer and Setter 
as a Limited Agent; 
1 ne Listing Broker, Jayson C CrltChfleld. represent* [XJ Sellar ( 1 Buytr [ J both Buyer and Seflar 
a« a Limited Agent; 
The Selling AoenL Javrfljgflq [. petarsen. represents ( J S#tl*r [X] Buyer ( ] both Buyer and Seller 
aa a Limited Agent; 
The Selling Broker. Uflrjq VyoicQtL represents [ ] 8alter [X] Buyer ( ] both Buyer and Seller 
aa a Limited Agent; 
S. TITLE INSURANCE. At Settlement, Setter agraas to pay for a standard-coverage owner's poSicy or title Insurance 
Insuring Buyer In tho amount of tha Purchase Price. Any additional title Insurance coverage shot! be at Buyer's expense. 
7. SELLER DISCLOSURES. No later than tne Seller Disclosure Deadline referenced in Section 24(b), Seller shall provide 
to Buyer the following documents which are collectively referred to as the •Salter Disclosures": 
(a) a Seller property condition disclosure for the P-opriy, signed an»J det^d by Seller; 
(b) a commitment for the policy of thle/inaVance: 
/ / / / / I / 
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?d) WrHteri notice of any claim* nnd/or conations known to Seller relating to environmental problems and building or 
zoning code violations': end 
(el Other (soeclry) nortimnntatlftn " f Zoning from Sftlt l.aKB City 
* . " U r s r a «?f?HT ra CANCEL B A S E D DM EVALUATIONS AND INSPECTIONS. Buyer's obligation to purchase 
under this Contract (check appUcaWe boxes): 
(a) DO IS r 11S NOT conditioned upon Buyer's approve* of the content of all the Seller Disclosures referenced in 
Secign f i 
(b) [X] IS M IS NOT conditioned upon Buyere approval of a physical condition inspection of the Property; 
(cl f f i s DC] IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer's approval of a survey of the Property by e licensed surveyor ("Survey); 
(cf) fX] IS M W NOT conditioned upon Buyer's approval of the cost terms and availabtflty of homeowner's insurance 
coverage for the Property; 
W IX]1$ | J1$ NOT conditioned upon Buyers approval or the following teats end evaluations or the property: 
(specify) 
Pest ^ijpffjftofi & any othf r t^sts requested bv tne orQfessionai horns insppcira 
If any of the above) items ere cnecfteo in tne affirmative, then Section* o. i . 6.2.6.3 ami 6.4 awry, uvmt woe, tiwy do not 
appiy* * ne name cnecneo w the anurnawrv aowii » » COmSCwwy ivrmfdu !va»mo u.VoiU«wfi9 *» irwjwvwT**. v^o*~£ 
OiTmrnlio pfOVKivu ft wife Contrsct, the Sre&sSsro 5 '-ssccsono shnH fco s&i for b)' Suyer end she!! be conducted 17 
!nd:v:di:s!t Of sntlt&S Cf Buyer's cftefce. Seller egrees to cooperate; with th* evaluations & Inspections and with the 
wtrfk-thraugh inspection under Section 11. 
e.1 Evaluations A Inspections Deadline. No later than the Evaluations & inspections Deadline referenced In Section 
24(c) Buyer shall: (a) complete all Evaluations & Inspections; 9r¥i (b) determine it the £ valuations & Inspections are 
acceptable to Buyer. 
5-2 Kigm to Cancel or Object, if ouy«r determine* wis; the Evs&a&ions & inspections sro unacceptable. Buyer may. 
no SsSer than tfcs gvsfcatiens * tnspecfons Dcs£s:c, cither: {a} csnee! ft5s Centric! by providing written retre to Seller. 
whereupon the Earnest Jersey Deposit shell be released to Buyer; or (b) provide Seller with written notfc* of objection*. 
9<9 Failure to Respond. It by tho expiration of the Evaluations & Inspections Deadline, Buyer does not (a) cancel this 
Contract as provided in Section 9.2: or (b) deliver a written objection to Seller regarding the Evaluations & Inspections, the 
Evaluations & Inspections shall be deemed mppco^d by Buyer. 
*.4 Response by Seller. If Buyer provides written objections to Setter. Quyor and Seller ehaH have seven calendar 
days after Sellers receipt of Buyer's objections (the "Responsa Period") in which to agree in writing user- thy msarcr cf 
reserving Buyer*s objections. Except as provided in Section 10.2, Sailer may. but shaM not be required to. resolve Buyer's 
objections. If Buyer and Seller haye not agreed !n writing upon the manner of resolving Buyers objections, Buyer may 
cancel this Contract by providing written notice to Seller no later than three calender days after expiration of the Response 
Period; whereupon the earnest Money Deposit shall be releaced to Buyer. If this Contract Is not canceled by Buyer under 
e*"s Section 6.4, Buyer's objections shall be deenHKi waived by Buyer. Thfe waiver shall not affect those Items warranted 
In Section 10 
e, ADDITIONAL TERMS. There [XJ ARE I J ARE NOT addenda to this Contract conteining additional terms. If there 
are, the terms of the following addenda are Incorporated Into this Contract by this reference: {X] Addendum No. QfiQ 
I ] Setter Financing Addendum ( ] FHA/VA Loan Md**\ds*m { } Assumption Addendum [X ] Load-Based Paint 
Disclosure & Acknowledgement (in some transactions this disclosure Is required by law) | ] Lead-Based Paint 
Addendum (In some transaction* this addendum Is required by law) £ J Other (specify): 
10. SELtER WARRANTIES AMD REPRESENTATIONS. 
10.1 Condition of Title. SeSer represents that $e«er has fe« title to the Property end w<H convey good and marketable 
tills to Buyer at Closing by general warranty deed. Buyer agrees, -howaver, to accept title to the Property subject to the 
toflowfng matters of record: easements, deed restrictions, CCfcrTs (meaning covenants, conditions *n<l restrictions), end 
rights-of-way, and subject to the contents of the Commitment for Title Insurance as agread to by Buyer under SecWon 8. 
Buyer also agrees to take the Property subject to existing leases affecting the Property and not expiring prior to Closing. 
Buyer agrees to be responsible for taxes, assessments, homeowners association dues, utilities, and other services 
provided to the Property after Closing. Except for any lean(s) specifically assumed by Buyer vndoc Section 2.1(c). Setter 
will cause to be paid off by C!o$fng all mortgages, trust dOQd*< judgments, mechanic's liens, tax Hens and warrants. Sefler 
will cause to be paid cunent by Closing ait assessments end homeowners e?sGc&i&n d^ss. 
ie .2 Condition of Property. Seller warrants that the Property witt oe in the following condition ON THE DATE 
SELLER DELIVERS PHYSICAL POSSESSION TO 8UYER: 
(a) the Property shell be Droom-clean a no irot 01 deorifr and personal belongings. Any Seller or tenant 
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nwwlnfl-r«lat«%d damaae to the Prooertv shal t>e reoalrad at Salter's expanse; 
fbftha heetina, cooling. electrical, plumbing and aprinfcler systems and fixtures, and in* appear*** ami « I"*F«C*» W«S 
ba In working order and m for Their lntenoeq purposes; 
tcf tne roof and foundation anaii be fieo vi* i««n» iinGwi *£ w6*«n » 
\w/ «ny pr»»»»w wiMcr ss^wv u»»»« »*ri i .^ viv i •*•*•*•*•**j ^ ^ " c i c t ^ ^ y v -*-.—••_ ^ .• ; •*-• — —— ..~...~ _  ..._... ....„ 
" "7*\ <n* Proo^rty ^nd Trnprovementx, Including the landscaping, will be In the same general condition as they were on 
the date of Acceptance. * • * * .*. 
10.3 Home Warranty Plan, i n« 'Home Warranty Pianr referenced in ihis Svct'fuh 10.3 & rop«?£t6 ««»« ths 
warranties provided by Sever under 5eciiorn> iu.i ««ITU Ivu: www^vwvi i BppirviM*;* wS»5/i 
. ... * .-• m— p t text i 2L« siis* j .tii-t-r »— r—:..>*—r ^ «t.:- • r r ~ - v ~ * ^ if fr%£l«wf<v« fK» Unrna Warranto 
Pisn STJOU bs orcfe^d by [ 3 Suysr { J Salter find shsi! be issued by a company safsctaH hy f 1 Buyer [ 1 Seller. The 
cost c' the Home Warrant" P?sn shsS not exceed $ . and shall ba paid for at Settlement by ( ] Buyer 
I } SeHar. 
11. WALKTHROUGH INSPECTION, 8efor* Settlement. Buyer rrnty. upon reasonebSe notice and at a reasonable time, 
conduct a "watk-throush" inspection of the Property to determine only that the Property is *as represented/ meaning that 
the Items mlerttnceil In Sections 1.1, BA and 10.2 (The Items') are respectively present, repaired/changed as agreed, and 
in the warranted condition, if the Hems ere not as represented. Seller will, prior to Settlement, replace, correct or repair The 
Items or. with the consent of Buyer (and Lender if eppficabte), escrow an amount at Settlement to provida for the same. 
The failure to conduct 8 walk-through inspection, or to ciaim that an item is not as represented, shelf not constitute a 
waiver by Buyer of the right to receive, on tha data of possession, the items as represented. 
12. CHANGE? DURING TRANSACTION. Seller agrees that from the data of Acceptance until tha date of Closing, none 
of the following shall occur without the prior written consent of Buyer: (a) no changes kt any existing leases shett ba mace; 
(b) no new leases shall be entered Into: (c) no substantial alterations or Improvements to the Property shaQ be made or 
undertaken: and (d) no further flnancla? encumbrances to the Property ahaff bs nssd^. 
13. AUTHORITY OF SIGNERS. If Buyer or Seller la a corporation, partnership, trust, estate, limited liability company, or 
other entity, the person executing this Contract on its behalf warrants his or her authority to do so and to bind Buyer and 
Seller 
14. COMPLETE CONTRACT, This Contract together with its addenda, any attached exhibits, and SaBer Disclosures, 
constitutes the entire Contract between the parties and supersedes nod replaces any and all prior negotiations, 
representations, warranties, understandings or contracts between the parties. This Contract cannot be changed except by 
written agreement of the parties. 
15- DISPUTE RESOLUTION. Tha parties agree that any dispute, arising prior to or after Closing, related to this Contract 
(check applicable box) 
[X] SHALL 
[ 1 MAY AT THE OPTION OF THE PARTHES 
first be submitted to mediation. 11 the parties agree to mediation, the dispute shall be submitted to mediation through a 
mediation provider mutually agreed upon by the parties. Each party agrees to bear Its own costs of mediation. If mediation 
falls, the other procedures and remedies available under this Contract shell apply. Nothing in this Section 15 shall prohibit 
any party from seeking emergency equitable relief pending mediation. 
10* DEFAULT. If Buyer defaults, Setter may elect either to retain the E^nwsz Money Deposit as liquidated damages, or to 
return It and sue Buyer to specifically enforce this Contract or pursue other remedies available at law. If Seller defaults. In 
adtitoon to return of the Earnest Money Deposit. Buyer may elect either to accept from SeBer a sum equal to the Earnest 
Mor.ey Deposit as liquidated damages, or may sue SeHer to specifically enforce this Contract or pursue other remedies 
aveRable at tew If Buyer elects to accept liquidated damages. Seller agrees to pay the liquidated damages to Buyer upon 
demand. H Is agreed that denial ot a Loan Application made by the Buyer is not a default end is governed by Section 
17. ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS. In the event of litigation or binding arbitration to enforce this Contract, the prevailing 
party shall be entitled to costs and reasonable attorney fees. However, attorney fees shall not be awarded for participation 
in mediation under Section 15. 
1$. NOTICES. Except as provided in Sectron 23. all notices r^ulred under this Contract must be: (a) In writing; (b) signed 
by the party giving notice; and (c) received oy the other party or me other party's zgent no later than the applicable date 
referenced in this Contract. 
19. ABROGATION. Except for the provisions of Sections 10.1. 10.2, 15 and 17 and express warranties made in this 
Contract, the provisions of this ContractihaH not apply after Closing. >ntractiha 
M Psee A ?f 6 pay^a Salter's initiate (fr JF-J Par* hyQ'£r> rBuvcr'q Initio Q W On* t\~ys I &S 
i-eo \JdL u s U J : l a p j o n n r ~ r t o n a n a e r s o n 1 H U 1 Y^N* D V / U P - 4 
FPTIM rvnup P P « TOP c^npa nn.LPN FAX NO: : i m% ?f& ^ I T R 
T0:26S413b r. r 
2© RtSK OP LOSS- AH risk of Iocs to ths Property, including physical damage or aestrucuon to cnt» r « n w i y ««' «w 
improvements due to any cause except ordinary wear and tear and bas cau*vv Dy «w»~«5 ••» a«»rtsn; s s r ^ n , rSS:! fce 
borne hy Seller cnm the transaction 19 ctu**u. 
21. TIME !-5 OF T H i ESSENCE. Time is of the essence regarding the dates set lortrt MI wis Contract* exwnswm IMUW v6 
agreed to (n writingby aU parties. Unless otherwise explicitly slated m this Contraci; (ej ^ ^ ' * " * r ^ J j ^ " ^ ^ Sccls*': 
of this Contract which reference* a date anau aosoiutery be requira vj ;}£v J *m »VvCKin™;y ;;pc « : «*£ * ~ ~ »s*~; *^d 
lb) tne term ~oay*r anaii mean calendar Oay* »r?u » w i 1>S cot;r;;cc ss^nnifts c^ l^t vS" "vsffi::^ «:$ svsns vth racers 
Sna5 r«>i De StnwnS vpOT, Tttfe compsr.!^ fsnCcrs, 2p?f3!r-r* end o^.er? no* j ? * * * * k> this Contract, except as otherwbe 
cci^^d tc in writlnc bv si/ch non—£M*rtY. 
22. £AX TEASSSSSSlOh! AHD COUNTERPARTS Faceimsie {'sxj transmission c t s signed copy of this Contract, any 
addenda and counteroffer*. And the retransmission of any signed tex shall be the same as delivery of an original Thfe 
Contact artf any addenda and counteroffers may be executed In counterparts. 
23. ACCEPTANCE. "Acceptance* occurs whsn Seller cr Bayer, responding to an offer or counteroffer of the other: <a) 
sjg^s the offer or counteroffer where noted to indicate ecceptsnee; *n$ (p) communicates to the other party or to the other 
pstft/s agent that the offer o' eo\jnt«MK>ffer has heon stoned as required. 
24. CONTRACT DEADLINES. Buyer and SeSer 39,-9* thai tte fcSwang dsad&nes che« eppfy to this Contract*. 
{aj Lcsn Application & Fee Deadline 
{b} Suffer Ptecfeeurw Deadline 
(c) Evaluations & Inspections Deadline 
(d) Loan Denial Deadline 
(e) *ppntmm Deadline 





^jAjA w r g k < . 
Ffruv yv>rr^^ tew*- \ 
2$. OFFER AND TIME FOR ACCEPTANCE. Buyer offers to purchase the Property on U10 above terms and conations, if . 
Se«er does not accept this offer oy: W.fid t I AM p( ] PM Mountain Time 
this offer shall lapse; and the Brokerage shall return the Earnest Money Deposit 
ck: JLf2c£ r's Signature) * 0 ""t^fer liate) ' ISuyer's Signature} {CffsxOata) 
The later of the aboy* Qffor Dates ehall be referred to as the rOff«r fUferertce Date" 
<8uyers' Names) {PLEASE PRINT) 
4362 S Deno Or, W«t Viitoy City. 
1JI 84120 TO1 ^39,0229 
(Notice Address) (Zip Code) (Phone) 
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I J * C C £ ! * T A M C I OF OFFER TO PURCMASE: Setter Aocopts the foregoing offer on tne terms end conditions specified 
above 
( i i ^ C V N T £ £ G £ r " : SeSsrpresents fcf Svyer's Accepts *»£* theterr*?o*8vye«*? offer subject tothe exceptionsor 
/ -H f r - ly 7/jfl A * . 
(S«««rtc BJ2«stu<-*) {Data) (Time) (Seder's Signature) (Date) (Time} 
KfotsJ ^fyrrjrtc: 
(Sellers* Names} (PLEASE PRINT) (Notice Address) (8p Code) (Phone) 
[ 3 R£JgCTIOW: SeBar rajaets the foiaoolng offmr. 
(SelterlB Stoaaturei (Date) (Time) (Seller's Signature) (Dete) (Time) 
OOCUMENT RECEIPT 
Slate >aw require* Broker to furnish Buyer and Setter wfcfc coptas of this Contract peering a l eignetures ( H H in applicable 
section betow.) 
A. I f^*r»~»»~? f^V»« **£•?£• cf • !!f»»« COO** S* •*!* fhrtwwww* rV#nrr*rt haetrin<i s»B icinnatt innr 
(ByjfSf'e Signettre) (D**e) (Buys'* Signature) (Data) 
(Setter's Signature) (Date) (Setter's Signature) (Date; 
6 . i personalty caused e final copy o* tfw foregoing Coruraoi bedfffig &Ji ifgnatafvi to t v f J fifijCiu { } n«S'ted { J h«nd 




T K » fCSS? ATPS0YS3 5T T«S ^TAtt RSAL ESTATZ CCXSKSStOM A«0 W £ CFFSCE Of TM* UTAH MTTOHHST QtXZML. 
EF FCCTJVfi AUOU5T 3L 2009. IT RCPLACES ArfO SUFCftf EDES A U PREVIOUSLY APPROVED VERSIONS OF THIS FOAM. 
Page6of 6 psoas Seler** lnrtiai* fl/fcA/ Data l^^6 O^T CBuvW* )ntt»»n c ^ ^ l Date * K / » ^ ^ 
. n h n u ^ t f l n anderson 1 801 1/^K 5770 p , 6 
eo un uo u j : i b p jOhn \r
 x ton anaerson 
FPnM :YDI_IP RTOLTQP S^NTY?O nn I EN TOY NO *I .q i^ ?£« di^p T^ m PS :?#fls n«:^qpM P7 
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%n Oner Reference pftie of \ 5 Ci V^ xL*^ Q » £^7Cr^/ mCiuuwiy «« pifOT 5wo«t5» SUM C5Uiwaiv«»«j«©, bstvss^r. 
T A * JJ I «Ml»a. -WM T i l l MUTT I .^ 1 VI .11, IV \T~)^y ir I V\YW y v v ******* I ^yf* * *"*** 
i f l W c n o 4- qraypvSd^ fore fou^vr-VPUAT^K f ^1-erYvtcl/l 
mv\rM uu» f AOn-H^ /JU r^ >hAA \^A/\ vnrHftfa^ vsak-ifjp*. ~* 
(^AVvE^r^ynK .. ^ 
2- faij^ rtlMn^wVfi^nfS fovfrr~s#frTo* UJ^of R&TC vsT 
VO**- ^ 
BUYER ANO SELLER A 5 K £ £ THAT THE CONTRACT DEAJjrLmES REFERENCED ir» SEvTiG™ 24 Of Tffi REPC 
(CHECK AFPL5CA3LE SOX): r\7£E«A.'S2 U^*ia£GED { ] ARE CttAtfGED AS FCU.CWS: 
To the extent the terms of tftfe ADDENDUM noddy or con«<c! with any provisions of the REPC. Incl^ng all prior ecfefcnda 
and cwateroffeis, these t«ros shall control AH other terms of the REPC. indudlnp an prior &tyF*%^<t counteroffers, 
not modified by this *f>DENDUM shall femeinjjje same. t>H Selkrr t 1 Buyer shell have until fo^ffy t JAWMPM 
Mountain Time on ^ \fj V\ ^U/% ^ T ^ P ^ y fDatef td accept the terms of this ADDENDUM in oocordance wrfh the 
provisions of Sectiorr23 cf the REPC. Unless so accepted, the offer as set forth m this ADDENDUM shelt lapse. 
h</g<r \-v\*r 
] S*8*r Slgifciim-^ (Date) (Time) [ ] Buyer [ J Se»er Signature (Date) (Time) 
ACCEPTANCecOUNTEROFFER^EJECTtQW 
CrCCKONE: 
{ J ACCEPTANCE: [ ] Setter { J Buyer hereby accepts the terms of tho ADDENDUM. 
FER: f J Seller | ^f6uyec presents 9s a counteroffer the terms of attached ADDENDUM NO >X 
A^-^JT *7*itit f.m 
(SignatireY (Date) (Time) (Signature) (Date) (Time) 
[ 3 REJECTION: [ J Seller [ J Buyer rejects the fbrogong ADDENDUM. 
(Signatuie) (Date) (Time) (Signature) (Date) (Tl^T 
TVHS FORM APriCOVCO 8Y THE UTAH REAL ESTATE COMMISSION AND THE OFFICE OF THE UTAH ATTORNCY OCNCRA4-, 
EFFECTIVE AUGUST S. 2003 IT REPLACES W O $UP€R*£0E8 ALL PREVIOUSLY APPROVED VERSIONS OF THIS FORM. 
l i lSlll i Form 1-A 
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DIVISION 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 




Case No, QSO^QOOO / 
JUDGE \\a*^i ow 
SHARON CRAIG ANDERSON and 
COLLEEN CRAIG ERICKSON, 
Defendants. 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff and complaints of the Defendants and for cause 
of action alleges as follows: 
1. This is an action to partition certain real property, more particularly 
hereinafter described, pursuant to the provisions of § 78-39-1, etseq., Utah Code 
Annotated (1953, as amended). 
2. Plaintiff and Defendants are residents of Salt Lake County, Utah. 
3. The real property which is the subject of this litigation is situate in Salt 
Lake County, Utah, and is more particularly described as follows: 
16-18-181-013 Commencing 272.25 feet West from the 
Southeast corner of Lot 1, Block 12, 5 Acre Plat "A", Big Field 
Survey; thence West 66 feet; North 170.1 feet; East 66 feet; 
South 170.1 feet to the point of beginning. 
4. On January 19,1981, Ada Craig executed a quit claim deed to the 
above-described property conveying the same to herself, Sharon V, Craig (nka Sharon 
Anderson) and Colleen R. Craig (nka Colleen Erickson), as joint tenants, subject to a life 
estate in Ada Craig. Said deed was recorded on January 19,1981, in Book 5202 at Page 
1168, as Entry No. 3525030, in the office of the Salt Lake County Recorder. 
5. On January 21,1999, Ada Craig conveyed her interest in the subject 
property to Carolyn Abbott also subject to a life estate by quit claim deed recorded 
January 28,1999, in Book 8241 at Page 2974 Entry No. 7237662 in the office of the Salt 
Lake County Recorder. The interest of Carolyn Abbott was subsequendy conveyed to the 
Plaintiff herein by quit claim deed dated May 20, 2002, and recorded June 3, 2002, in 
Book 8605 at Page 1545 as Entry No. 8251901 in the office of the Salt Lake County 
Recorder. 
6. Plaintiff is the owner of an undivided one-third interest in the subject 
property. 
7. Defendants are the owners as joint tenants of the remaining two-thirds 
interest in the subject property. 
8. Ada Craig is the parties' mother and is now deceased. 
- 2 -
9. There are no liens or encumbrances appearing of record on the property, 
and Plaintiff has no knowledge of any parties who claim an interest in the property or 
who will be materially affected by this action other than these parties. 
10. Plaintiff has obtained a tide report from Sutherland Tide Company, 
and such report is located at the offices of the attorney appearing hereon and may be 
used, inspected and copied by the parties to this action. 
11. During the last years of Ada Craig's life, Plaintiff assisted her in the 
management of the property as rental units, using the proceeds therefrom to pay the 
expenses on the property and pay a portion of Ada Craig's care and support. 
12. Plaintiff and Defendants have been unable to agree on the operation 
or disposition of the property since some time prior to the death of Ada Craig, and in 
fact, as the result of the dispute between the parties, the property is now vacant. 
13. Plaintiff has approached the Defendants requesting that they either 
purchase his interest therein or consent to the sale of the property with a division of the 
proceeds between them. 
14. Defendants have refused Plaintiffs request and have refused to 
cooperate with Plaintiff in the management and care of the property. 
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15. Plaintiff has no objection to maintenance and necessary repairs to the 
premises to ready it for sale, but does not wish to become involved in or pay for exten-
sive or unnecessary work to the property. 
16. Defendants have undertaken an effort to deny Plaintiff a rightful 
interest in the tide to the subject property, including the filing of a false affidavit with 
the Salt Lake County Recorder's Office which asserts that Defendants are the sole tide 
holders to the property. 
17. Defendants have further caused the locks to be changed on the 
premises for the purpose of preventing Plaintiff from entering the premises and other-
wise asserting possession as an owner thereof. 
18. Without cause and without the approval or participation of Plaintiff, 
defendants caused a three-day notice to quit to be served upon the only tenant on the 
property, resulting in the vacating of said property by the tenant and loss of further 
income. 
19. Such effort on the part of Defendants to deny Plaintiff his interest in 
the tide to the subject property and rightful benefits as an owner thereof has been made 
by Defendants in bad faith with an intentional effort to deprive Plaintiff of a property 
interest legally and rightfully belonging to him as evidenced by valid conveyances on 
record with the Salt Lake County Recorder's Office. 
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20. Such bad faith on the part of Defendants has necessitated the filing of 
this complaint by Plaintiff, and Plaintiff is entitled to relief under § 78-27-56, Utah Code 
Annotated (1953, as amended) including his costs, expenses and attorney fees incurred 
in bringing this action and in defending his rightful interests in the subject property. 
21. The dispute between the parties is ongoing and to undertake any 
control of the premises without the participation of the Plaintiff will further the dispute 
and antagonism between the parties. 
22. Due to the disruptive nature of the relationship between the parties, 
Plaintiff believes that the property is in danger of material damage, abuse or neglect 
unless a receiver is appointed to take and keep possession of the property, to receive the 
rents, to collect debts, and generally do such acts respecting the property as the court 
may authorize during the pendency of this litigation. 
23. In order to bring the dispute between the parties to an end, Plaintiff is 
informed and believes and alleges that a partition by sale of the property, rather than a 
physical division thereof, is more equitable to the parties in that although the property in 
question contains a number of rental units, it was originally constructed as a single 
family residence and the physical partition and apportionment and distribution of rents 
and expenses will be impossible. 
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24. In the event that Defendants persist in their efforts to assert sole 
control of the premises without Plaintiffs consent and participation, Plaintiff requests 
that the court issue an injunction enjoining and restraining the Defendants from 
incurring further expenses on the property or taking income therefrom, if any, during the 
pendency of these proceedings. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests: 
1. That Defendants and each of them appear and answer this Complaint. 
2. The court decree partition of the above-described real property among 
the parties hereto according to their respective rights. 
3. The court decree that the real property be sold in its entirety pursuant 
to §78-39-1, etseq., Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended), and a division of the net 
proceeds thereof among the parties hereto and according to their respective rights 
including the costs of the title report obtained by Plaintiff. 
4. The Defendants be restrained and enjoined from incurring any further 
expenses on the property or taking any income therefrom. 
5. A receiver be appointed by this court to oversee and manage the 
property during the pendency of this litigation in accordance with the requirements of R. 
66, Utah R. Civ. Pro. and that the costs and expenses of such receiver be paid by 
Defendants. 
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6. For reasonable attorneys1 fees incurred by the Plaintiff in the prosecu-
tion of this action by reason of the actions undertaken in bad faith by Defendants 
pursuant to § 78-27-56, Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended). 
7. For an order that the costs, disbursements and expenses of this action, 
including the costs of partition and sale, and the costs of the receiver, be paid by the 
Defendants and be made a lien upon their share of the proceeds of the sale of the real 
property. 
8. Plaintiff be granted such other and further relief as the court may deem 
just and equitable. 
DATED this J - ^ day oLk%ttst, 2003. 
Plaintiffs address: 
4931 South Fairview Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
'sC4< 
ANDERSON 
for Plaintiff 
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